I can't remember the gist of it now because I missed the first class - to my eminent chagrin - but my first assignment in a "Statistics and Decision-making" class revolved around the o-ring issue.
Yeah, for a bunch of eggheads those guys a NASA have a really rough time with statistical analyses. That failure really was striking when it came to the two shuttle disasters. At the same time, it's easy to see how these failures happen. The people making the busine$$ decisions aren't the ones making the safety decisions, and they all have their own deadlines and pressures. And in the end the money people tend to be above the technical people. One of the recommendations of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board was the creation of a upper-level position reconciling those two departments. Somebody who could try and bridge the gap. Since NASA is pretty much out of the manned spaceflight business now there's no telling if that ever happened.
I've got a documentary somewhere about one of the two Thiokol engineers who were screaming bloody murder about the whole thing. He did the public speaker circuit for a while, and his premise was pretty much based on his refusal to sign off on the launch and being both the hero and the outcast as a consequence. I'll see if I can find it and send it your way. One of the reasons the two shuttle disasters fascinate me so much is that they're as much people-problems as technical failures, and business culture within NASA was such a huge part of it.
I'd be interested in that doc as well; I'd forgotten the similarities between the two incidents.
From a personal perspective (and a human perspective as well) I do truly hope that the occupants of Challenger and Columbia had no idea what was happening... the atmospheric break up of Columbia gave me terrible thoughts of what survivors of the initial break-up may have seen/experienced before they died.
To get to the core of why they're both the same accident you should read
Feynman's appendix to the Rogers Commission's final report. He explains NASA's tendencies towards bad reasoning in several different areas. Then watch any documentary on either of the mishaps and you'll see the same faulty logic in play over and over and over.
The Thiokol engineer I was thinking of is named Al McDonald. If you search YT for
Al McDonald Challenger you'll find a variety of vids of him telling his story in various lengths ranging from 10 to 60 minutes. He actually crashed a public portion of the Rogers Commission and absolutely torpedoed a NASA witness with dramatic results. That very much changed the course of the investigation. For a broader overview there's an excellent doc produced by a PBS station in Jacksonville called
A Rush to Launch, and it's largely centered around McDonald. While it covers the whole shebang, Al makes up a huge portion of the content. He essentially tells the same story you'll see in any of the YT videos (the man's got it down to word for word at this point) but also includes other sources and data.
As for the nuts and bolts, NASA's own video investigation unit put together the best explanation for what actually happened that you'll find. It doesn't discuss any of the causes, but simply and concisely explains exactly what happened. The nature of the accident was actually quite different than what people assume based on simply watching the blowup video.
https://youtu.be/MKG4bvZGWag?t=904The folks aboard Columbia, at least the ones on the flight deck, were aware that something was going wrong, but not necessarily enough to spook them. It was just becoming difficult to pilot as airflow was disrupted over the starboard wing. When the shuttle rotated beyond its aerodynamic stress limit it broke apart and they all hypoxia'd out PDQ. The amount of time for terror was quite brief. The Challenger crew's fate is much less understood. It's possible that some of them survived the whole way down to the big splash, almost 3 minutes later. The likelihood is that they lost consciousness almost immediately. There were signs that some of them took action to access O2, but their suits were incapable of keeping them alive in that situation. While NASA passed along a great deal of information about Columbia's crew survivability, it's fairly tight-lipped about Challenger's, though.