"Thoughts" On Naturalism

[Omega]

Scientific naturalists hold that immaterial concepts like "thought," or "mind," or "love," etc either do not exist at all (therefore such words refer to nothing), are metaphors for essentially biological processes (the immateriality of their existence is an illusion), or they in some as-yet-unexplained way "emerge" from biological processes (and so are dependent on them). Yet if our thoughts are a product of biological processes, then the thought "all thought is the product of biological processes" is itself a product of those processes. How can we place any confidence, then in its correspondence to reality?

[rumborak]

By having objective experiments that confirm the notion. Scientific magazines have been full of experiments that have been conducted which established that just about every aspect of the human mind has a "seat" in the biological brain.

rumborak

[Cool Chris]

By not caring whether or not any of the orignal post is true and/or relevant to anything?

I am not trying to be a dick. I just don't think 99.9999% of the population are concerned with whether or not 'love' exists, is a metaphor, or whatever.

[rumborak]

IMHO this is one of those fruitless discussions such as "is a rose still a rose when you know it's just a collection of atoms?" or "Deconstructing a rainbow as refracted light by droplet is taking away its beauty". Simple answer: It can be both.

rumborak

[Scheavo]

By having objective experiments that confirm the notion. Scientific magazines have been full of experiments that have been conducted which established that just about every aspect of the human mind has a "seat" in the biological brain.

rumborak

To add to this with the last point, though, we still don't have a way to explain how the brain truly produces what we feel. While we can point to the part of our brain that turns the an electrical signal into what we see, but that still doesn't explain what it means to see something. There is a huge gap between showing the physical thing, and explaining the actual experience.

Which is one reason why I think some people say those emotions don't exist, becuase there isn't something for "love." There's an old Buddhist parable of there being no soul, that I think illustrates the point quite well. That's the logic of perspectivalism, essentially.

Love "doesn't exist" because what love is, as far as we can objectively measure it, is an arrangement of neurotransmitters, or whatnot, but it is not something concrete. It's making a statement about how much we are responsible for the World we experience, and that the World we experience is not the ultimate reality. Of course love exists as a feeling, but the source of that existence is not the "objective world."

At least, that's my take on it. Not sure if those naturalists your thinking of think the same way, but either way, I can understand what they're saying, even if they don't mean it precisely.

Who says we can place ultimate, decisive confidence in our senses to correspond with reality? We can't detect radiation, even though it kills us. I'm color blind, so I can't see some colors other people (mostly woman) see; in one case, I couldn't see a "pink" fungus on some carrots at work. Girl spotted them 50 feet away, I was holding it in my hands and could only see something if I put it in front of a light. And of course, there's the blind spot you're not aware of, your brain just fills in the visuals. Our sense work pretty well, they've evolved after all, but they are far from perfect, and they can add details to reality that are often not there.

Yet if our thoughts are a product of biological processes, then the thought "all thought is the product of biological processes" is itself a product of those processes. How can we place any confidence, then in its correspondence to reality?

I fail to see how that's a problem. If strict determinism is true, then it's true that things are determined.

[Super Dude]

Oh my, I thought we were going to talk about the other kind of naturalism.

[rumborak]

To add to this with the last point, though, we still don't have a way to explain how the brain truly produces what we feel. While we can point to the part of our brain that turns the an electrical signal into what we see, but that still doesn't explain what it means to see something. There is a huge gap between showing the physical thing, and explaining the actual experience.

There is of course a huge different between the two, no doubt. But, to use an analogy, the state of neuroscience is akin to somebody standing in front of the fuse box of a big, lit building. He switches off a fuse and the light goes out in part of the building; he switches off another, and a different part goes black. Does he know the wiring, or how exactly the building is lit? No. But, he can confidently say that the building isn't magically lit by some other process, but instead by whatever power goes through the fuses.

rumborak

[Ryzee]

Omega- I notice that you're always tripping about modular forms and elliptic curves, infinite fire revolving around infinite parallels, fractals of infinite reality, each cascading, gliding in an infinite wheel.  You gotta chill man.
 

[Scheavo]

To add to this with the last point, though, we still don't have a way to explain how the brain truly produces what we feel. While we can point to the part of our brain that turns the an electrical signal into what we see, but that still doesn't explain what it means to see something. There is a huge gap between showing the physical thing, and explaining the actual experience.

There is of course a huge different between the two, no doubt. But, to use an analogy, the state of neuroscience is akin to somebody standing in front of the fuse box of a big, lit building. He switches off a fuse and the light goes out in part of the building; he switches off another, and a different part goes black. Does he know the wiring, or how exactly the building is lit? No. But, he can confidently say that the building isn't magically lit by some other process, but instead by whatever power goes through the fuses.

rumborak

And I'll I'm pointing out is that we know what electricity is, we don't know what consciousness is. So, I don't disagree with anything you're saying.

There's just simply more to life than what science can simply tell us. It doesn't mean science is wrong, it just means it doesn't fully answer the questions of existence or reality.

[lonestar]

Processes like that, I feel, are the denizens of the spiritual realm.  They cannot be physically measured in any way, but we all know that their existence can't be denied.  The combination of these things make up our spirituality, as opposed to our physicality.

[jasc15]

And I'll I'm pointing out is that we know what electricity is, we don't know what consciousness is. So, I don't disagree with anything you're saying.

There's just simply more to life than what science can simply tell us. It doesn't mean science is wrong, it just means it doesn't fully answer the questions of existence or reality.

The extraordinary level of complexity of the mind doesn't imply mysteriousness.  The phenomena at work in the brain are understood on an individual level, but the chaotic (not random) nature of these interacting phenomena combine to give us emotion.

To ask whether emotions and feelings are "real" we need to define what those words mean. If they are the chaotic combination of neural activity, then they are real.  If we try to define it as something other than natural, biological processes, then that just adds unnecessary philosphical wankery.

[Scheavo]

And I'll I'm pointing out is that we know what electricity is, we don't know what consciousness is. So, I don't disagree with anything you're saying.

There's just simply more to life than what science can simply tell us. It doesn't mean science is wrong, it just means it doesn't fully answer the questions of existence or reality.

The extraordinary level of complexity of the mind doesn't imply mysteriousness.  The phenomena at work in the brain are understood on an individual level, but the chaotic (not random) nature of these interacting phenomena combine to give us emotion.

Yet, the chaotic nature of our brains doesn't help explain why we feel the emotions we do. Let me put it this way... there are major aspects of the human brain we can copy with a computer - but when we do this, do we think that the computer gains consciousness? Does a computer doing 2+2 think the way I think to get the answer of 4? There's a gap between what w know physical causes our emotions, and how we feel and experience those emotions. It's a glaring philosophical problem, one I don't think anyone has actually believed they've solved.

I'll state it again, we don't know what consciousness is. We just don't. If it's an emergent property of the brain, then we cant' point to any one part of the brain, how it works, etc, to define consciousness. It's fallacious to use parts to define the whole.

[Omega]

Are you a materialist, Scheavo?

A determinist?

[Scheavo]

I'm really not sure of the most precise term... a Heideggarian? A German idealist? Phenemenologist?

I believe there's a material world, which is responsible, in one fashion or another, for what I experience. This world is universal; that is: you and others live in this same world, etc. However, by and large, what I experience day in and day out is not this universal world, but a fabrication of the brain, and what I identify as myself, or consciousness. Everything we experience, especially our senses, are a certain interpretation of the world, formed by the success of evolutionary advantage. Our thoughts are in a language which we did ourselves not make, and whose logic influences are brain structure and interpretation of the world.

I don't think we really control our actual actions. Whatever consciousness is, I think it has influence over the material world. The material world forms consciousness, but this does not mean consciousness is deterministic, especially considering the material world is not deterministic. There's numerous observable effects where our conscious perception influences what physically happens, and reality will behave differently depending upon how we try to test it (Quantum Zeno effect). What's interesting, is that these effects are universal, so it appears to be a trait of the real world. And really, the math and logic behind quantum mechanics is probabilistic, not deterministic.

So I think we can influence how we respond to emotions, how we think, and basically help lay the framework which more or less controls our actual actions. I think this has room roots in the concept of an aporia, at least as Derrida has thought about it.

Beyond that, I'm agnostic.

[rumborak]

Scheavo, if I understand you correctly, you're kinda misusing the term "deterministic". If you say the material form creates consciousness (which I agree with) and that material is deterministic (which it is at that level), then all it produces must be deterministic. However, it is still so complex with its billions of neurons that it is almost hopefully unpredictable.

I read about something the other day that is actually a good analogy. In any solar system with more than 3 bodies, it is virtually impossible to predict the trajectories of the bodies past a certain point. And that, despite their paths being completely deterministic. Do the planets have free will in their paths? Hardly. It's just naturally impossible to predict it past a certain point.

rumborak

[Scheavo]

That's not really a good comparison to quantum mechanics. It's not that it's too complex to know, it's in the results are uncertain and influenced by our conscious awareness. It's qualitatively different. I'm using deterministic per it's concept, That the fate of the universe, and everything that would ever happen, is simply the unfolding of time. That view is rejected by every physicist I've talked to, and every physics working with quantum mechanics I've heard speak about the issue. I'm taking the physicists word for it.

There are observable events and data that exists which simply cannot be explained by strict material determinism.

[rumborak]

I don't think quantum mechanic effects apply to the brain. Especially because quantum mechanics is random by its very nature, which doesn't exactly help with creating consciousness.

rumborak

[Scheavo]

Then you have a huge job of explaining how quantum mechanics doesn't effect the brain. Everything which the brain is made up of, follows said rules. Brain activity requires the flow of electrons, which are quantum in nature.

Which isn't me saying I think you're wrong, it's just we don't know how quantum mechanics relates with Newtonian physics. But there's no reason to think that there's a sudden "break" between the quantum world and the world we experience, in fact there's every reason to think it's a nice sliding scale.

Or are you proposing that determinism is an emergent property of a random/probabilistic reality? I'm not sure I really disagree with that, it's an intriguing interpretation.

[slycordinator]

Does a computer doing 2+2 think the way I think to get the answer of 4? There's a gap between what w know physical causes our emotions, and how we feel and experience those emotions. It's a glaring philosophical problem, one I don't think anyone has actually believed they've solved.

I'm not sure about this. For instance, when they used that Watson computer on Jeopardy it regularly would look at a handful of possible answers then calculate how confident it is in each one based on its available knowledge and base answers on that. And while some people may say that's not how they figure out answers, I think it's pretty damn close.

[Cyclopssss]

The only place I walk around buttnekkid is in the comfort of my home, thank you. 

[jasc15]

There's a gap between what w know physical causes our emotions, and how we feel and experience those emotions. It's a glaring philosophical problem, one I don't think anyone has actually believed they've solved.

Looks like this is going the way of the free will discussion.  The gap you are proposing is inserted between natural physical processes.  This gap must exist for free will to exist.  This gap must be supernatural, that is outside the natural processes to alter the cause and effect chain.  There is no space between these processes in a deterministic model.

[Odysseus]

Scientific naturalists hold that immaterial concepts like "thought," or "mind," or "love," etc either do not exist at all (therefore such words refer to nothing), are metaphors for essentially biological processes (the immateriality of their existence is an illusion), or they in some as-yet-unexplained way "emerge" from biological processes (and so are dependent on them). Yet if our thoughts are a product of biological processes, then the thought "all thought is the product of biological processes" is itself a product of those processes. How can we place any confidence, then in its correspondence to reality?

I find that an interesting question, and have done for a while.  I guess there a part of us that wants to really know what is happening at a fundamental level, but another part of us that has to use what we find to construct a 'reality' that is meaningful to us.

[Scheavo]

There's a gap between what w know physical causes our emotions, and how we feel and experience those emotions. It's a glaring philosophical problem, one I don't think anyone has actually believed they've solved.

Looks like this is going the way of the free will discussion.  The gap you are proposing is inserted between natural physical processes.  This gap must exist for free will to exist.  This gap must be supernatural, that is outside the natural processes to alter the cause and effect chain.  There is no space between these processes in a deterministic model.

Actually, that's not true. I may have been unclear in some areas, and perhaps too sloppy to be quotable, but basically saying something is super-material does not necessary means that it's supernatural. I know there's a theory regarding consciousness that it's an "illusion" created by memory and language, which would mean that it's not really real. This theory would be having consciousness as "super-material," but completely denies any sense of freedom.

[Scheavo]

Does a computer doing 2+2 think the way I think to get the answer of 4? There's a gap between what w know physical causes our emotions, and how we feel and experience those emotions. It's a glaring philosophical problem, one I don't think anyone has actually believed they've solved.

I'm not sure about this. For instance, when they used that Watson computer on Jeopardy it regularly would look at a handful of possible answers then calculate how confident it is in each one based on its available knowledge and base answers on that. And while some people may say that's not how they figure out answers, I think it's pretty damn close.

Watson is the best we've created, and it's a very specific program, but it's accomplishment was much over hyped. The scientists and people who made the machine and software were much more humble, becuase this kind of programming is inherently faulty, and not what we would call truly intelligent.

We can program a computer to play chess, and beat anybody. But it doesn't play or think remotely close to what a human player does. There's a really good book out there on it, What Computers Still Can't Do, by Hubert Dreyfus. The man literally changed the field, and he did it philosophically by reading Heidegger.

[slycordinator]

On that same note, Watson clearly doesn't entirely think like humans because of the fact that it got one answer wrong in spite of the fact that the same wrong answer was given by one of the other contestants. Granted, it is unlikely that it was programmed with speech recognition and was merely parsing sentences fed from the screen.

[Omega]

Actually, that's not true. I may have been unclear in some areas, and perhaps too sloppy to be quotable, but basically saying something is super-material does not necessary means that it's supernatural. I know there's a theory regarding consciousness that it's an "illusion" created by memory and language, which would mean that it's not really real. This theory would be having consciousness as "super-material," but completely denies any sense of freedom.

Are you saying that this "super-material" essence (thing, form, etc) is immaterial?

[rumborak]

I believe he's referring to the same "immaterialness" that the concept of a rose is when compared to the fact that it's just a collection of organic molecules. It is only a rose to us humans, I.e. the concept only exists in our specific framework, but there's nothing objectively "rose" about it. Similarly the "mind" is just a concept humans give to a collection of hardwired processing loops inside the brain.

rumborak

[Scheavo]

Actually, that's not true. I may have been unclear in some areas, and perhaps too sloppy to be quotable, but basically saying something is super-material does not necessary means that it's supernatural. I know there's a theory regarding consciousness that it's an "illusion" created by memory and language, which would mean that it's not really real. This theory would be having consciousness as "super-material," but completely denies any sense of freedom.

Are you saying that this "super-material" essence (thing, form, etc) is immaterial?

I just meant to imply that it's not a "thing" strictly speaking, according to the logic rumborak brought up. I perhaps need a better term for what I mean, I just sorta view such an emergent property as being something extra than the material thing which makes it up.

Similarly the "mind" is just a concept humans give to a collection of hardwired processing loops inside the brain.

Depending what you mean, I either agree or disagree. What I think of as the mind, and what you think of as the mind, and as we both would define it, is a concept. But the actual experience of the mind? I don't see how that can be a concept. Something is experiencing something, and I don't think we can just wipe away the experiencing we all experience.

Okay, that last part is probably nonsense, but I can't think of how to better phrase it so succinctly.

[rumborak]

When I see a bunny in a cloud field, does that mean there is a bunny? Just because we subjectively perceive something doesn't mean it's anything special or substantive.

rumborak

[senecadawg2]

This is why I love P/R

[Scheavo]

When I see a bunny in a cloud field, does that mean there is a bunny? Just because we subjectively perceive something doesn't mean it's anything special or substantive.

rumborak

I agree with that. I'm not trying saying that because we experience something as something, that it makes what we experience substantive. I'm trying to say, and admittedly am don't think I'm doing a very clear job of putting it, we experience something as something. To take a visual analogy, when we see things, we naturally overlook the fact that there's light which is responsible for us seeing those things. We don't see light, we see things which are in the light. Similarly, We don't experience things, we experience things which are in consciousness. Why should I experience anything at all? What is this "light" which allows me to see things?

We cannot doubt that we exist, can we? I don't really agree, well, anything Descartes says after "cogito ergo sum," but I don't know how to deny that I exist, that I feel.

[Rathma]

When I see a bunny in a cloud field, does that mean there is a bunny? Just because we subjectively perceive something doesn't mean it's anything special or substantive.

The question though isn't whether there is a bunny (or a cloud for that matter) but is of the subjective experience itself. Identifying objects and explaining experiences is one thing (a complex process that involves memory) but the sensation itself is something quite different. "The sensation of colour cannot be accounted for by the physicist's objective picture of light-waves. Could the physiologist account for it, if he had fuller knowledge than he has of the processes in the retina and the nervous processes set up by them in the optical nerve bundles and in the brain? I do not think so."

[rumborak]

Why not? That's like saying you could never know how a certain car drives even when you know every single bolt.
It might be very difficult to do so, but I don't think there's anything inherently preventing one from doing so.

rumborak

[Rathma]

Why not? That's like saying you could never know how a certain car drives even when you know every single bolt.

Not really. The only way to communicate how a car drives is by using symbols, and the same goes for bunnies or clouds. But how could you possibly convey the sensation of 'red' itself without using symbols or metaphors? I don't want to say for sure that science can't bridge that gap, but there's really no reason to believe that it ever will, if not only for that nobody has the slightest clue what that even means.

[rumborak]

I have the impression we're actually saying the same thing really. I agree that science might never be able to describe it accurately, but not out of the reason that it's inherently something outside of the purview of science, but simply because it's unfeasible to do so.

rumborak