Nietzsche

[Scheavo]

Um, wow. Because Sartre is a perspectvist, doesn't mean he's not an existentialist. Just because Nietzsche "is" a nihilist, doesn't mean he's not a perspectivist. Perspectivism is a way of lookiing at the world, and it's the way in which Kant solved the modern "crisis" of "subject" and "object" (which we know to be false interpretations of the world). Perspetvisim is relative, but it not merely up to the persons desires and feelings, as you make it out to be. Try as I want, I cannot desire a square to be a circle. Just not gonna happen. You overlook this latter portion of perspectivism all the time. There IS a common world we all share, a "reality," but we don't directly experience that reality, we experience and interpretation of said reality - and while interpretations will all vary, you cannot interpret anything you desire.

We are not interested in moral epistemology, Scheavo; we're interested with moral ontology. The question is "do objective moral values and duties exist, and if so, were are they grounded?"

If objective morals and values do exist, how do you know they exist? You cant' really cut epistemology out of any question of philosophy, as epistemology is at the root of ever single question regarding philosophy. It's the first hurdle you have to get over, if you have any desire of getting anywhere. If you can't know if moral objective values exist, it doesn't really matter if they do exist. If you try to make any claim regarding objective moral values, and how they are founded, without first answering if you can know about such values, then you are simply stating an opinion on the matter.

You seem to be completely unaware of Nietzsche fundamental theory of "will to power."

In so far as the world "Knoweldge" has nay meaning, the world is knowable; but it is interpretable otherwise, it has no meaning behind it, but countless meanings. - "perspectivism.

"it has no meaning behind it," can be easily interpreted as saying its meaningless. But that's obviously not what he means, because he says it has countless meanings. Instead, what he is saying is that there is no one meaning behind the word "knowledge." It is not that it can mean anything, it's that it has countless meanings, making it not this one meaning, or that one meaning - which is to say, there is no meaning behind it.

I had a professor make a hermeneutical point once, that really helped me understand this. To take a relevant example, "The Will to Power" says two things: one's will to power, which is probably the most natural way to interpret that statement - but also, the will which belongs to power, power itself having a will.

All Nietzsche is saying is that, at bottom, there is no objective meaning in the universe or of anything other than what we subjectively ascribe to it. Hence there are countless meanings which each individual can subjectively impose on their own existence or on the universe.

Nietzsche is calling for us to do away with our old values, and to do so he shows us how faulty they are. But, he explicitly wants to replace these old values, with new values. He calls for a new method of evaluation, not no system of evaluation.

He that speaks here...has even now lived through the whole of nihilism, to the end, leaving it behind, outside himself

Because the values we have had hitherto thus draw their final consequence; becuase nihilism represents the ultimate logical conclusions of our great values and ideals -Because we must experience nihilism before we can out what value these "values" really had.- we require, sometime, new values.

This world is the will to power - and nothing besides! And you yourselves are also this will to power - and nothing besides!

[rumborak]

I see you're quoting Omega, and his broken-record pet topic of moral objectivity.

Inb4thelock

[eric42434224]

I see you're quoting Omega, and his broken-record pet topic of moral objectivity.

Inb4thelock

Here we go again.   

[theseoafs]

I see you're quoting Omega, and his broken-record pet topic of moral objectivity.

Inb4thelock

Here we go again.   

[Omega]

Well, before I respond, Scheavo, thanks for the consideration of starting a thread (though, as precedent has shown, the thread may spiral into madness again as non-philosophically oriented people come into the thread and state something along the following {just as rumborak and He-whose-name-I-shall-not-utter seem to already be on the path to doing  }: "What is this I don't even! We must lock this thread! I don't know what the crap Omega is saying!"). Also, the topic isn't really about Nietzsche, I might add. It's -- as you may have guessed -- whether morality is objective and the consequences of whether it is or is not. I only mentioned Nietzsche merely as an example of an atheist who was able to follow out the repercussions of his atheism fully and logically.

If objective morals and values do exist, how do you know they exist? You cant' really cut epistemology out of any question of philosophy, as epistemology is at the root of ever single question regarding philosophy. It's the first hurdle you have to get over, if you have any desire of getting anywhere. If you can't know if moral objective values exist, it doesn't really matter if they do exist. If you try to make any claim regarding objective moral values, and how they are founded, without first answering if you can know about such values, then you are simply stating an opinion on the matter.

The claim that moral values and duties are rooted in God is a meta-ethical claim about Moral Ontology, not about Moral Linguistics or Epistemology. It is fundamentally a claim about the objective status of moral properties, not a claim about the meaning of moral sentences or about the justification or knowledge of moral principles.

Keeping the distinction between moral epistemology and moral ontology clear is the most important task in formulating and defending a moral argument for God’s existence. A proponent of that argument will agree quite readily (and even insist) that we do not need to know or even believe that God exists in order to discern objective moral values or to recognize our moral duties. Affirming the ontological foundations of objective moral values and duties in God similarly says nothing about how we come to know those values and duties. The theist can be genuinely open to whatever epistemological theories his secular counterpart proposes for how we come to know objective values and duties.

You might say "how do we know that objective moral values and duties exist?" But it’s no part of my argument to claim certainty about these matters. There are very few matters in life about which we can be certain. All that matters is that, after thoughtfully reflecting on the question of moral values and weighing the alternatives, we come to the conclusion that, yes, objective moral values probably do exist. And the answer to that question is: “Because I clearly apprehend objective moral values and have no good reason to deny what I clearly perceive.” (Our moral intuitions clearly tell us, for example, that it is clearly wrong to rape and kill a young girl.)

This is the same answer we would give to the skeptic who says, “How do you know you’re not just a body lying in the Matrix and that all that you see and experience is an illusory, virtual reality?” We have no way to get outside our five senses and prove that they’re veridical. Rather I clearly apprehend a world of people and trees and cars and houses about me, and I have no good reason to doubt what I clearly perceive. Sure, it’s possible that I’m a body in the Matrix. But possibilities come cheap. The mere possibility provides no warrant for denying what I clearly grasp.

There is no more reason to deny the objective reality of moral values any more than there is to deny the objective reality of the physical world. If we trust our sensory intuitions that there is a physical world external to us, then there's no reason why we shouldn’t trust our moral intuitions of the realm of objective values.

[Scheavo]

I have no idea how you are trying to separate "certainty" and "proof" and "arguments" from epistemology. The attempt to separate ontology from epistemology is just disastrous. What good does it do to "prove" something ontologically, if it still isn't proved epistemological? It means you haven't proved anything, it means you have nothing but an opinion. You have a justified position, you do NOT have a justified true opinion, which is required for something to be acceptable to a philosopher.

If you cant know if God exists, you cant know for sure whether objective morals exist. Objective morals could also exist for reasons other than God, so assuming for a second that we can perceive objective morals, you still have to show how this demonstrates God's existence - or it makes God a concept with no meaning, and down a road which you don't like.

Also, the topic isn't really about Nietzsche, I might add. It's -- as you may have guessed -- whether morality is objective and the consequences of whether it is or is not.

Wow, now you're even telling me why I made the topic. Astounding.

I think it's amazing that you can tell someone to go read a philosopher, when you don't want them to actually take anything those philosophers said to heart. I mean think about it, Nietzsche considers your position ludicrous, that the conception of objectivity and Truth is, well, not True. "The Truth is that there is no Truth."

[eric42434224]

Round One:  Scheavo

Ding Ding

 

[Omega]

I have no idea how you are trying to separate "certainty" and "proof" and "arguments" from epistemology. The attempt to separate ontology from epistemology is just disastrous. What good does it do to "prove" something ontologically, if it still isn't proved epistemological? It means you haven't proved anything, it means you have nothing but an opinion. You have a justified position, you do NOT have a justified true opinion, which is required for something to be acceptable to a philosopher.

Scheavo, moral epistemology asks: "how do we know the moral values and duties that we have?" or "how do we gain access to those objective moral values and duties and know when we've correctly done so?"

Before we can even ask these questions, Scheavo, we must first ask if objective moral values and duties even exist.

Henceforth, moral ontology asks: "what is the foundation for objective moral values and duties?"

Again, as I said, I am completely open to any sort of moral epistemology that someone might want to suggest: moral intuition, divine revelation, logical inference from the intrinsic value of human persons, etc. I don't care for any particular moral epistemology.

My argument is simply that in the absence of God, we don't have any ground for affirming the existence of objective moral values and duties.

You are confusing how we come to know moral values and duties with what grounds moral values and duties.

Before I can even effectively answer your questions, you must answer the following: do we agree that objective moral values and duties exist? You could formulate the question another way: is it objectively morally wrong for me to rape and murder a 5 year old girl (as our moral intuitions clearly tell us would be)?

If you assert that objective moral values and duties do not exist, Scheavo, then what reason can you give for distrusting your moral intuitions which tell you otherwise?

If you cant know if God exists, you cant know for sure whether objective morals exist.

1. If God exists, then we have a sound foundation for objective moral values and duties.
2. If God does not exist, then we do not have a sound foundation for objective moral values and duties.

Notice that these are conditional claims. Maybe you are right that atheism is true and God does not exist. That wouldn’t affect the truth of the two contentions. All that would follow is that objective moral values and duties would, then, not exist.

Objective morals could also exist for reasons other than God.

As I said, all attempts to ground objective morals ontologically in a secularist foundation have failed. There is no sound foundation for objective moral values and duties that is not in God. If you believe I am wrong, then you need to offer a sound foundation for objective moral values and duties apart from God.

So, assuming for a second that we can perceive objective morals, you still have to show how this demonstrates God's existence - or it makes God a concept with no meaning, and down a road which you don't like.

Theism provides a sound foundation for objective moral values. Moral values have to do with what is good or evil. On the theistic view objective moral values are grounded in God. As Anselm saw, God is by definition the greatest conceivable being and therefore the highest Good. Indeed, He is not merely perfectly good, He is the locus and paradigm of moral value. God’s own holy and loving nature provides the absolute standard against which all actions are measured. He is by nature loving, generous, faithful, kind, and so forth. Thus if God exists, objective moral values exist, wholly independent of human beings.

Theism also provides a sound foundation for objective moral duties. On a theistic view objective moral duties are constituted by God’s commands. God’s moral nature is expressed in relation to us in the form of divine commandments which constitute our moral duties or obligations. Far from being arbitrary, God’s commandments must be consistent with His holy and loving nature. Our duties, then, are constituted by God’s commandments and these in turn reflect His essential character. In the Judeo-Christian tradition, the whole moral duty of man can be summed up in the two great commandments: First, you shall love the Lord your God with all your strength and with all your soul and with all your heart and with all your mind, and, second, you shall love your neighbor as yourself. On this foundation we can affirm the objective rightness of love, generosity, self-sacrifice, and equality, and condemn as objectively wrong selfishness, hatred, abuse, discrimination, and oppression.

Theism has the resources for a sound foundation for morality: it grounds both objective moral values and objective moral duties; and hence, I think it’s evident that if God exists, we have a sound foundation for objective moral values and duties. Thus if we are to come to realize that objective moral values and duties do exist, then they must be grounded in transcendentally supreme foundation apart from mere arbitrary and subjective human constructs or the ever-changing natural world, which in atheism cannot be anything but a meaningless, purposeless, undesigned universe with no reason for its existence, governed by blind, meaningless, indifferent and purposeless forces. If you were to disagree that God exists, then it follows that objective moral values and duties do not exist.

Wow, now you're even telling me why I made the topic. Astounding.

I think it's amazing that you can tell someone to go read a philosopher, when you don't want them to actually take anything those philosophers said to heart. I mean think about it, Nietzsche considers your position ludicrous, that the conception of objectivity and Truth is, well, not True. "The Truth is that there is no Truth."

Of course Nietzsche believed that no objective moral values and duties exist. He realized not only that without a transcendent and rational foundation in God, objective moral values and duties did not exit, but that without God, our existence and that of the universe is utterly and objectively meaningless, purposeless and undesigned; nothing but matter in motion, indifferent to the plight of man and to its very own existence. Being so that he did not, in fact, believe in God led him to realize that there are no objective moral values and duties and that the universe was completely indifferent to our existence and that our existence was meaningless and purposeless. All humans, Nietzsche thought, live meaningless and purposeless lives which are all destined to end in the perpetual darkness of death. After coming to this realization, he struggled greatly with his wanting to condemn actions taken by his fellow Europeans at the time as "evil" or "wrong" or "good" or "just" when, as he realized, without God, such words were meaningless! Nietzsche was, accordingly, a moral nihilist who saw that morality does not exist as a transcendentally objective reality; therefore no action is preferable to any other. As a moral nihilist, Nietzsche would say that, for example, murdering and raping someone, for whatever reason, is not inherently right or wrong. At best we can only subjectively state that we "don't like" rape and murder, but we aren't obligated from abstaining from either. Under nihilism, whoever has impunity or power over others would be free to murder and rape as he sees fit, with little or no fear of facing reprimand. Might would make right. And if you don't agree, off with your head.

(As a side note, never mind the fact that the statement: "the Truth is that there is no Truth" is self-refuting.)

[Scheavo]

I have no idea how you are trying to separate "certainty" and "proof" and "arguments" from epistemology. The attempt to separate ontology from epistemology is just disastrous. What good does it do to "prove" something ontologically, if it still isn't proved epistemological? It means you haven't proved anything, it means you have nothing but an opinion. You have a justified position, you do NOT have a justified true opinion, which is required for something to be acceptable to a philosopher.

Scheavo, moral epistemology asks: "how do we know the moral values and duties that we have?" or "how do we gain access to those objective moral values and duties and know when we've correctly done so?"

Before we can even ask these questions, Scheavo, we must first ask if objective moral values and duties even exist.

....

So, you think it's somehow possible to ascertain that objective values and duties exist, a priori to ascertaining if we can know such moral values and duties exist?

I mean, don't you see the blatant contradiction? We're going to know that objective values and duties exist... without knowing if objective moral values and duties exist... if we can't know if objective moral and duties exist, then talking about their existence is pure irrationality.

As I said, all attempts to ground objective morals ontologically in a secularist foundation have failed. There is no sound foundation for objective moral values and duties that is not in God. If you believe I am wrong, then you need to offer a sound foundation for objective moral values and duties apart from God.

All attempts to identify objective morals have failed. All attempts to identify something "objective" have failed. There is no sound foundation for objective morals and values, because there is no sound foundation for God's existence, which is what you're entire argument hinges upon.

As a moral nihilist, Nietzsche would say that, for example, murdering and raping someone, for whatever reason, is not inherently right or wrong.

As I've already quoted, Nietzsche, if he was a nihilist, was only a nihilist because he did not successfully pass through. He fully wanted a new system of evaluation, one whereby you could determine the value of an action. Whether or he succeeded in that is another question, but he did try to give the framework for judging actions. I've quoted that, so you are wrong.

Nietzsche was just the first philosopher to truly deal with evolution, evolutionary theory, etc. Surprisingly, if you actually read him, he didn't make the mistakes most Darwinist and philosophers made at the time, and he did NOT make it every man for himself. Something could be right, because it works or succeeds, becuase it enhances one's power, one's will to power. Something could be wrong, because it doesn't work, it fails, it leads to death.

That it does not matter whether a thing is true, but only what effect it produces ... Everything is justified, lies, slander, the most shameless forgery, if it was serves to raise the temperature

You ignore that bold part, the IF. So not EVERYTHING is justified, it's only justified if it does certain things, certain measurable effects.

The value for life is ultimately decisive.

So ya, he is not nearly the nihilist you and many others proclaim him to be. You just don't understand the system of values he tries to impose. He calls for nihilism because once must pass through nihilism, nihilism was for him a historical necessity, resulting from the FAILURE, the ABJECT FAILURE of your philosophy.

I'm assuming at this point that you haven't read The Will to Power.

*edit*

This ties in with the perspective view of morality through genetics and evolution. Evolutionarily speaking, and in terms of DNA, our species found success through cooperation. People who kill other members of their society will generally get killed, making it harder for them to pass on their DNA, meaning society will slowly start to lose some traits of that person, which society itself found undesirable. This influences our brain structure and our behavior.

Every single person listens to their moral intuition. This moral intuition is based upon genetics and society. So, there's my moral epistemology. It's based upon things we know, genetics and evolution - and not some fanciful "God" that has never been proven, and which we don't know exists.

"the Truth is that there is no Truth" is self-refuting.

Exactly, it's supposed to be. It wouldn't be consistent if it wasn't. Truth is a conceptual tool needed to get you to a place where you no longer need that conceptual tool.

[Omega]

So, you think it's somehow possible to ascertain that objective values and duties exist, a priori to ascertaining if we can know such moral values and duties exist?

I mean, don't you see the blatant contradiction? We're going to know that objective values and duties exist... without knowing if objective moral values and duties exist... if we can't know if objective moral and duties exist, then talking about their existence is pure irrationality.

Have you reading what I have been writing? Once more into the fray... I don't think you're understanding the difference between moral epistemology and moral ontology, Scheavo.

Moral epistemology asks: "how do we come to know these objective moral values and duties," Not "how do we come to know if they exist". (A possible answer to this question is, for example, "Through the Divine Revelation or the Bible, which outlines which moral values and duties we should follow" or "Through the intellect, which illuminates which actions would be wrong or right to take" etc ad nauseum.)

Again, moral ontology asks: "Do objective moral values and duties exist, and if so, where are they grounded?"


(Please don't ignore the following again:)

We must first establish if we have good reason to believe that objective moral values and duties exist. So is there? Of course there is. Our moral intuitions clearly tell us that it is absolutely and objectively wrong -- regardless of people's opinions -- to rape and murder a 4 year old girl or that we have a duty to love a child rather than to abuse him or her. Again, Scheavo, why distrust our moral intuitions? Analogously to asking "how do you know that objective moral values and duties exist?" would be the question of "how do you know you’re not just a body lying in the Matrix and that all that you see and experience is an illusory, virtual reality?" The same answer that we would give to a skeptic of the external world would be the answer we would give to the person who is a moral skeptic. Just like in regards to the existence of objective moral values, we have absolutely no way of knowing for sure that we are not a brain in a vat being stimulated by electrodes into believing that the world we see and feel is real, yet we trust our sensory intuitions that the external world is real. Why not likewise trust our moral intuitions that there is a realm of objective moral values and duties?

As I said, all attempts to ground objective morals ontologically in a secularist foundation have failed. There is no sound foundation for objective moral values and duties that is not in God. If you believe I am wrong, then you need to offer a sound foundation for objective moral values and duties apart from God.

All attempts to identify objective morals have failed. All attempts to identify something "objective" have failed. There is no sound foundation for objective morals and values, because there is no sound foundation for God's existence, which is what you're entire argument hinges upon.

Once again I am led to believe that did not bother to read my posts carefully:

1. If God exists, then we have a sound foundation for objective moral values and duties.
2. If God does not exist, then we do not have a sound foundation for objective moral values and duties.

Notice that these are conditional claims. Maybe you are right that atheism is true and God does not exist. That wouldn’t affect the truth of the two contentions. All that would follow is that objective moral values and duties would, then, not exist.

All attempts to identify objective morals have failed.

Hopefully you'll answer this time when I ask you: Do your moral intuitions not tell you that raping and killing a 4 year old child is objectively wrong, regardless of people's opinions?

All attempts to identify something "objective" have failed.

I'll give you the benefit of the doubt and assume that you mean this only of moral values and duties.

As a moral nihilist, Nietzsche would say that, for example, murdering and raping someone, for whatever reason, is not inherently right or wrong.

As I've already quoted, Nietzsche, if he was a nihilist, was only a nihilist because he did not successfully pass through. He fully wanted a new system of evaluation, one whereby you could determine the value of an action. Whether or he succeeded in that is another question, but he did try to give the framework for judging actions. I've quoted that, so you are wrong.

"After coming to this realization, he struggled greatly with his wanting to condemn actions taken by his fellow Europeans at the time as "evil" or "wrong" or "good" or "just" when, as he realized, without God, such words were meaningless!"

Any of Nietzsche's attempts to reconcile his nihilism with any hope for morality and meaning in life are in vain. There is no room for "success" of any kind once one embraces nihilism.

Something could be right, because it works or succeeds, becuase it enhances one's power, one's will to power. Something could be wrong, because it doesn't work, it fails, it leads to death.

But given nihilism, Scheavo, there's no reason to think that what "works" or "succeeds" or "enhances one's power" is objectively "good" or that we are "obligated" to succeed; or because something "leads to death" doesn't objectively mean that such action is "wrong" under such a hopeless worldview, for at bottom, there is no evil, no good, no obligations, no prohibitions, no wrong, no right; nothing but pitiless, meaningless indifference to one's existence. In nihilism there are no moral truths, there is no meaning, no purpose, no reason at all for man's existence because man is nothing but a freak accident in an indifferent and purposeless universe who is inescapably destined to be swallowed whole by it and be ever forgotten.

That it does not matter whether a thing is true, but only what effect it produces ... Everything is justified, lies, slander, the most shameless forgery, if it was serves to raise the temperature

You ignore that bold part, the IF. So not EVERYTHING is justified, it's only justified if it does certain things, certain measurable effects.

Nothing is justified, nothing is unjustified. The only "meaning" we can ascribe to our existence is what we subjectively and arbitrarily decide to do so.

The value for life is ultimately decisive.

So ya, he is not nearly the nihilist you and many others proclaim him to be. You just don't understand the system of values he tries to impose. He calls for nihilism because once must pass through nihilism, nihilism was for him a historical necessity, resulting from the FAILURE, the ABJECT FAILURE of your philosophy.

I'm assuming at this point that you haven't read The Will to Power.

Failure only to Nietzsche, yes. And he was smart enough to realize the consequences of killing God.

The Madman jumped into their midst and pierced them with his eyes. "Whither is God?" he cried; "I will tell you. We have killed him---you and I. All of us are his murderers. But how did we do this? How could we drink up the sea? Who gave us the sponge to wipe away the entire horizon? What were we doing when we unchained this earth from its sun? Whither is it moving now? Whither are we moving? Away from all suns? Are we not plunging continually? Backward, sideward, forward, in all directions? Is there still any up or down? Are we not straying, as through an infinite nothing? Do we not feel the breath of empty space? Has it not become colder? Is not night continually closing in on us? Do we not need to light lanterns in the morning? Do we hear nothing as yet of the noise of the gravediggers who are burying God? Do we smell nothing as yet of the divine decomposition? Gods, too, decompose. God is dead. God remains dead. And we have killed him.

This ties in with the perspective view of morality through genetics and evolution. Evolutionarily speaking, and in terms of DNA, our species found success through cooperation. People who kill other members of their society will generally get killed, making it harder for them to pass on their DNA, meaning society will slowly start to lose some traits of that person, which society itself found undesirable. This influences our brain structure and our behavior.

Every single person listens to their moral intuition. This moral intuition is based upon genetics and society. So, there's my moral epistemology. It's based upon things we know, genetics and evolution - and not some fanciful "God" that has never been proven, and which we don't know exists.

Does atheistic-naturalistic evolution provide a sound foundation for objective moral values?

If God does not exist, then what basis remains for the existence of objective moral values? In particular, why think that human beings would have objective moral worth? On the atheistic view human beings are just accidental byproducts of nature which have evolved recently on a speck of dust called the planet Earth, and which are doomed to perish individually and collectively in a relatively short time. On atheism it’s hard to see any reason to think that human well-being is objectively good, anymore than insect well-being or rat well-being or elephant well-being. Nature in and of itself is just morally neutral.

On a naturalistic view moral values are just the behavioral byproducts of biological evolution and social conditioning. Just as a troop of baboons exhibit cooperative and even self-sacrificial behavior because natural selection has determined it to be advantageous in the struggle for survival, so their primate cousins homo sapiens have evolved a sort of herd morality for precisely the same reasons. As a result of socio-biological pressures there has evolved among homo sapiens a sort of herd morality which functions well in the perpetuation of our species. But on the atheistic view there doesn’t seem to be anything that makes this morality objectively binding and true.

As Michael Ruse states:

"The position of the modern evolutionist … is that humans have an awareness of morality … because such an awareness is of biological worth. Morality is a biological adaptation no less than are hands and feet and teeth. …Considered as a rationally justifiable set of claims about an objective something, ethics is illusory. I appreciate that when somebody says ‘Love thy neighbor as thyself,’ they think they are referring above and beyond themselves. … Nevertheless, … such reference is truly without foundation. Morality is just an aid to survival and reproduction, … and any deeper meaning is illusory."

If we were to rewind the film of human evolution and start anew, people with a very different set of moral values might well have evolved. As Darwin himself wrote:

If … men were reared under precisely the same conditions as hive-bees, there can hardly be a doubt that our unmarried females would, like the worker-bees, think it a sacred duty to kill their brothers, and mothers would strive to kill their fertile daughters, and no one would think of interfering.

For us to think that human beings are special and our morality is objectively true is to succumb to the temptation to species-ism, that is to say an unjustified bias in favor of one’s own species. Thus our morality, even if the product of evolution, is completely arbitrary given that the evolutionary process that produced us is not only purposeless, meaningless and undesigned, but also could have given rise to creatures with a very different set of moral values were we to rewind the film of evolutionary history.

If there is no God, then any reason for regarding the herd morality evolved by homo-sapiens on this planet as objectively true seems to have been removed. Take God out of the picture, and all you seem to be left with is an ape-like creature on a speck of dust beset with delusions of moral grandeur.

Richard Dawkins’ assessment of human worth may be depressing, but why, on atheism, is he mistaken, when he says, “there is at bottom no design, no purpose, no evil, no good, nothing but pointless indifference. We are machines for propagating DNA. It is every living object’s sole reason for being”?

Does atheistic-naturalistic evolution provide a sound foundation for objective moral duties? Duty has to do with moral obligation or prohibition, what one ought or ought not to do.

First, natural science tells us only what is, not what ought to be, the case. Science is about facts, not norms; it might tell us how we are, but it wouldn’t tell us what is wrong with how we are. In particular it cannot tell us that we have a moral obligation to take actions which are conducive to human flourishing.

So, if there is no God, what foundation remains for objective moral duties? On the naturalistic view, human beings are just animals, and animals have no moral obligation to one another. When a lion kills a zebra, it kills the zebra, but it does not murder the zebra. When a great white shark forcibly copulates with a female, it forcibly copulates with her but it does not rape her--for none of these actions is forbidden or obligatory. There is no moral dimension to these actions.

So if God does not exist, why think that we have any moral obligations to do anything? Who or what imposes these obligations upon us? Where do they come from? It’s very hard to see why they would be anything more than a subjective impression ingrained into us by societal and parental conditioning.

On the atheistic view, certain actions such as rape and incest may not be biologically and socially advantageous, and so in the course of human development have become taboo, that is, socially unacceptable behavior. But, that does absolutely nothing to prove that such acts are really wrong. Such behavior goes on all the time in the animal kingdom. On the atheistic view the rapist who chooses to flout the “herd morality” is doing nothing more serious than acting unfashionably, the moral equivalent of Madonna or hippies. If there is no moral lawgiver, then there is no objective moral law, and if there is no objective moral law, then we have no objective moral duties.

[senecadawg2]

 

[Scheavo]

*edit*

Honestly, I would suggest just skipping to the bottom. Everything else is most likely just going to cause a repeating pattern, but I tried to step back and put the argument in a different light. I feel if this discussion has any chance of moving forward, it'll come in that last section.

So, you think it's somehow possible to ascertain that objective values and duties exist, a priori to ascertaining if we can know such moral values and duties exist?

I mean, don't you see the blatant contradiction? We're going to know that objective values and duties exist... without knowing if objective moral values and duties exist... if we can't know if objective moral and duties exist, then talking about their existence is pure irrationality.

Have you reading what I have been writing? Once more into the fray... I don't think you're understanding the difference between moral epistemology and moral ontology, Scheavo.

Moral epistemology asks: "how do we come to know these objective moral values and duties," Not "how do we come to know if they exist". (A possible answer to this question is, for example, "Through the Divine Revelation or the Bible, which outlines which moral values and duties we should follow" or "Through the intellect, which illuminates which actions would be wrong or right to take" etc ad nauseum.)

Again, moral ontology asks: "Do objective moral values and duties exist, and if so, where are they grounded?"

I'm not necessarily asking about MORAL epistemology, I'm talking about epistemology in general. Meaning, what is knowledge, how do we know, etc. I am simply asking the question, How do we know objective morals and values exist? Furthermore, in any ontology, you're going to have to prove said belief, yes? Well, I really don't know how you propose we prove something, without bringing epistemology and knowledge into the equation.

All you're doing is rewriting the question to avoid the problem with it. The way you phrase is it fallacious, because it simply begs the question, "how do know if they exist?" You try to mislead.

We must first establish if we have good reason to believe that objective moral values and duties exist. So is there? Of course there is. Our moral intuitions clearly tell us that it is absolutely and objectively wrong -- regardless of people's opinions -- to rape and murder a 4 year old girl or that we have a duty to love a child rather than to abuse him or her.

You may know that, I may feel the same thing - but it is quite evidently clear that not everyone believes this. Otherwise, there would never be cases of a 4 yeard old getting raped and murdered. It's almost like you're ignoring the problem of evil.

Furthermore, as I just demonstrated, moral intuition is not the same as saying there is "objectively true" morals and values.

Lastly, if you read what I just posited to you, you'll notice that morality is NOT UP to individual persons opinions. It is up to genetics, society and one's upbringing. That is outside of oneself, one does not control that.

Again, Scheavo, why distrust our moral intuitions?

I never said I do distrust our moral intuitions. I in fact said just the opposite, and grounded my moral epistemology (there I am actually talking about a moral epistemology) in moral intuition. You are simply making the mistake of equating moral intuition, with God.

As I said, all attempts to ground objective morals ontologically in a secularist foundation have failed. There is no sound foundation for objective moral values and duties that is not in God. If you believe I am wrong, then you need to offer a sound foundation for objective moral values and duties apart from God.

All attempts to identify objective morals have failed. All attempts to identify something "objective" have failed. There is no sound foundation for objective morals and values, because there is no sound foundation for God's existence, which is what you're entire argument hinges upon.

Once again I am led to believe that did not bother to read my posts carefully:

1. If God exists, then we have a sound foundation for objective moral values and duties.
2. If God does not exist, then we do not have a sound foundation for objective moral values and duties.

Notice that these are conditional claims. Maybe you are right that atheism is true and God does not exist. That wouldn’t affect the truth of the two contentions. All that would follow is that objective moral values and duties would, then, not exist.

If they are conditional claims, then your claim that objective morals and values exist is not acceptable as True, and therefor everything you have been arguing no longer has a foundation. I gave you the benefit of the doubt, and assumed you're claiming consistent ideas. I apologize if that assumption was wrong.

Also, we obviously need to define "objectivity." The thing is, there is nothing you or I experience which is "objective." The degree to which I agree "objectivity" exists, is that I agree there is a World independent of either of us, a World which we share. Taking "objectivity" to mean this, then evolutionary theory clearly provides an objective way of understanding morals and values. Again, we can look at our DNA, we can look at our social history, we can look at our current social environments - all of these are objective features of the world which we can look at, and which provide insights and answers into morality and value. THe fact that it does not ground morality and value as something concrete is perhaps unfortunate, but you wanting there to be something more concrete doesn't change the fact that there doesn't appear to be anything concrete. You wanting something to be true, does not make said thing true.

All attempts to identify objective morals have failed.

Hopefully you'll answer this time when I ask you: Do your moral intuitions not tell you that raping and killing a 4 year old child is objectively wrong, regardless of people's opinions?

Think I've already clearly answered how moral intuition is not objective. Go ask a psychopath to consult their moral intuition. If moral intuition was the method by which we can determine objective morals exist, then people would not disagree about what is moral when consulting their intuitions.

The reason why, by and large, humans agree about what is moral, is becuase share evolutionary history, including genetic and social. Again, this does not cast objectivity out the window, it does not simply say, "whatever you desire to be moral, is moral." In fact, what you're proposing, that we can simply consult our moral intuitions to determine objective morality, means pyschopaths and other persons will commit atrocious crimes, becuase that's what their moral intuition tells them.

All attempts to identify something "objective" have failed.

I'll give you the benefit of the doubt and assume that you mean this only of moral values and duties.

Nope. Go look at quantum mechanics. Nothing is certain, everything is probabilistic, our and perception of reality effects and changes reality. I give you, the Quantum Zeno Effect. You cannot understand this observable effect clinging to the old concepts of "object" and "subject." The two are merged. Neither you or I have ever directly experienced anything which falls under the classic definition of an object, because everything we experience is a fabrication of our own minds.

What may have been unclear, was my definitions of these terms, which I (loosely) provided above.

As a moral nihilist, Nietzsche would say that, for example, murdering and raping someone, for whatever reason, is not inherently right or wrong.

As I've already quoted, Nietzsche, if he was a nihilist, was only a nihilist because he did not successfully pass through. He fully wanted a new system of evaluation, one whereby you could determine the value of an action. Whether or he succeeded in that is another question, but he did try to give the framework for judging actions. I've quoted that, so you are wrong.

"After coming to this realization, he struggled greatly with his wanting to condemn actions taken by his fellow Europeans at the time as "evil" or "wrong" or "good" or "just" when, as he realized, without God, such words were meaningless!"

Any of Nietzsche's attempts to reconcile his nihilism with any hope for morality and meaning in life are in vain. There is no room for "success" of any kind once one embraces nihilism.

Nietzsche said of himself that he had passed through nihilism. Are you going to honestly doubt the words of a man regarding his personal belief? He said you must pass through Nihilism, just like Kierkegaard's passage through despair (*gasp*), and he clearly tried to posit values and a system of values whereby one COULD call someone evil, wrong, good, or just.

What you're confusing, is the fact that Nietzsche couldn't use the system that was in place, the ideological framework which you vainly try to uphold, could not allow him to make these judgements. "The Truth is that there is no Truth," is also making the point that, if one assumes there to be truth, one is invariably lead to the conclusion that there is no Truth. Search for the truth, and you shall not find it. Just like, if you search for yourself, your soul, you will find nothing.

Something could be right, because it works or succeeds, becuase it enhances one's power, one's will to power. Something could be wrong, because it doesn't work, it fails, it leads to death.

But given nihilism, Scheavo, there's no reason to think that what "works" or "succeeds" or "enhances one's power" is objectively "good" or that we are "obligated" to succeed; or because something "leads to death" doesn't objectively mean that such action is "wrong" under such a hopeless worldview, for at bottom, there is no evil, no good, no obligations, no prohibitions, no wrong, no right; nothing but pitiless, meaningless indifference to one's existence. In nihilism there are no moral truths, there is no meaning, no purpose, no reason at all for man's existence because man is nothing but a freak accident in an indifferent and purposeless universe who is inescapably destined to be swallowed whole by it and be ever forgotten.

No one is saying given nihilism. I have made it quite clear that nihilism is a means, not an end. You're treating it like an end.

That it does not matter whether a thing is true, but only what effect it produces ... Everything is justified, lies, slander, the most shameless forgery, if it was serves to raise the temperature

You ignore that bold part, the IF. So not EVERYTHING is justified, it's only justified if it does certain things, certain measurable effects.

Nothing is justified, nothing is unjustified. The only "meaning" we can ascribe to our existence is what we subjectively and arbitrarily decide to do so.

Ignore the quote, or what? That quote clearly demonstrates that not EVERYTHING is justified, justification comes through the effects. If you lower the temperature, then the action is not justified. To put it in Nietzchian terms, if you are the ebb of this great flood, then you failed, then you did not succeed.

The value for life is ultimately decisive.

So ya, he is not nearly the nihilist you and many others proclaim him to be. You just don't understand the system of values he tries to impose. He calls for nihilism because once must pass through nihilism, nihilism was for him a historical necessity, resulting from the FAILURE, the ABJECT FAILURE of your philosophy.

I'm assuming at this point that you haven't read The Will to Power.

Failure only to Nietzsche, yes. And he was smart enough to realize the consequences of killing God.

LOL. Ya, it was a failure only to Nietzsche... which is exactly why so many philosophers and thinkers since have used this framework. Like, ya know, Sartre and Camus, those other philosophers you said people should read.

 Quantum mechanics works upon the principle of "killing God," - if God does not play with dice, then the fact that the universe plays with dice, means that there is no God.

And ya, the madmen is one of my favorite quotes. However, you'll notice that even after Nietzsche said that, that didn't make him run back to a faulty framework. The madmen is as much simply an historical account, as it is his personal opinion.

If there is no God, then any reason for regarding the herd morality evolved by homo-sapiens on this planet as objectively true seems to have been removed.

But that's not the argument. The argument is there we have developed a herd morality, which is objectively true. The morality which springs from it is not objectively true, as you would want to define it. I have on problem with the consequences this brings, becuase there are a host of other reasons why I shall still believe the morality that I believe, will still consult my moral intuition, etc.

So all that stuff at the end, not only do I see no problem with it, but I see no reason to think that there's a problem with it. Just becuase the world isn't as I wish it to  be, doesn't mean that the world is wrong. You having a dilemma and a problem with there not being something objectively True, especially regarding morality, doesn't mean jack shit. Sorry.

First, natural science tells us only what is, not what ought to be, the case. Science is about facts, not norms; it might tell us how we are, but it wouldn’t tell us what is wrong with how we are. In particular it cannot tell us that we have a moral obligation to take actions which are conducive to human flourishing.

I agree with the first part, I disagree with the last sentence. The thing is, science tells us that what is, is perspective morals. Natural science clearly tells us that your worldview is untenable, that it is not.

Science can tell us why we feel the moral obligation to help our fellow humans flourish. The fact that we all feel that same moral obligation is for you a sign of God, for me, and for scientific inquiry, it's because of evolution and social upbringing. Now, considering the fact's support my hypothesis, and don't give you hypothesis one ounce of support, I'm gonna go ahead and say that, regardless of how problematic my hypothesis may be (which I'll agree has trouble), it's a thousand times better than a hypothesis with absolutely no foundation and no reason to imagine is true.

What we "ought" to do, regarding novel situations, is subjective. I can consult my reasoning, my own intuition, and come to a conclusion that I feel is right - and then I can try and argue for other people to see the same thing. This is the role of philosophy, to try and determine what we ought to do. By consulting your moral intuition, you are not simply saying, "what is it that I believe?", you are consulting the billions of years of evolution, and the society you currently live in.

-----

Let's just take a step back though, and start with where we do agree:

We both completely agree that moral intuition is how we come to our moral conclusions.

Now, we have different ontologies for moral intuition, so let's compare those:

Your ontology for moral intuition is grounded in God, and that this provides us with an objectively, universal moral guide. This position hinges upon the existence of God, the conditional you have already made clear. Since we don't know the answer to this question, we really cant' go any farther than this, and the position is epistemologically unsound (meaning, we cannot know the answer). However, it's worth noting, as I already have, that people come to different conclusions regarding what is morally acceptable. This is an obvious fact, and to contend this is to start contending that the sky is blue. This obvious fact is also a direct challenge to the idea that moral intuition is universal, which pretty much falsifies your theory.

My ontology for moral intuition is grounded in evolutionary theory. This theory does not present universal morals, it provides perspective morals, and how those morals came to be. My theory hinges upon the veracity of evolutionary theory, as opposed to yours being upon God's existence. Now, the thing is, there is a massive amount of empirical and objective data to back up evolutionary theory. We have witnessed evolution occurring, on more than one occasion - and not just micro evolution. Evolutionary theory has an incredible power of explanation, it has helped us explain facts about the world that are otherwise unexplainable. This theory explains why people come up with different conclusions when consulting their moral intuition, as in, it gives an answer to the question of evil.

So, not only can my theory explain the same phenomenon as yours, but it can explain them with empirical data and observable facts. Yours cannot. That makes my theory epistemologically sound, and thus classifiable as knowledge. Your theory is epistemologically unsound, and so cannot be classifiable as knowledge.

[eric42434224]

Very well said Sheavo. 

[Scheavo]

Thank you.

Something else I just realized... assuming God does exist, it doesn't follow that objective morality has to necessarily exist. Maybe God wants people to do what they think they feel is right, he enjoys seeing their creativity. God could have crated the universe to see what happens, an experiment.

[soundgarden]

Not to mention the establishment of a moral philosophy based on the arbitrary choice of the Abrahamic god.

[MondayMorningLunatic]

tl;dr

[Omega]

You may know that, I may feel the same thing - but it is quite evidently clear that not everyone believes this. Otherwise, there would never be cases of a 4 yeard old getting raped and murdered. It's almost like you're ignoring the problem of evil.

Furthermore, as I just demonstrated, moral intuition is not the same as saying there is "objectively true" morals and values.

Think I've already clearly answered how moral intuition is not objective. Go ask a psychopath to consult their moral intuition. If moral intuition was the method by which we can determine objective morals exist, then people would not disagree about what is moral when consulting their intuitions.

I never said I do distrust our moral intuitions. I in fact said just the opposite, and grounded my moral epistemology (there I am actually talking about a moral epistemology) in moral intuition. You are simply making the mistake of equating moral intuition, with God.

The reason why, by and large, humans agree about what is moral, is becuase share evolutionary history, including genetic and social. Again, this does not cast objectivity out the window, it does not simply say, "whatever you desire to be moral, is moral." In fact, what you're proposing, that we can simply consult our moral intuitions to determine objective morality, means pyschopaths and other persons will commit atrocious crimes, becuase that's what their moral intuition tells them.

Our intuitions that tell us that objective moral values and duties do exist are as fallible as our sensory intuitions that tell us that the external world exists. So are we justified in concluding that the external world doesn't exist when our senses fail us or when they provide inaccurate information of the external world? Of course not! Just as our sensory intuitions may fail us or even be largely absent (Helen Keller; being blind, deaf, unable to smell, unable to feel, etc), so can our moral intuitions fail us and be largely absent. Yet we are no more justified in coming to the conclusion that, because our moral intuitions may fail us, objective moral values and duties do not exist just as much as we would not be justified in concluding that because our sensory intuitions fail us, the external world does not exist. Obviously there are people who lack moral intuitions altogether or others whose intuitions fail them and lead them to see an immoral act such as rape or murder as permissible. But without objective moral values and duties, we would not be able to condemn one such person who views murder as permissible because morality would then become a simple matter of taste or a social convention such as preferring to drive on the left side of street rather than on the right. In metaphysics, common sense regards skepticism about the external world as absurd. Yet it is not that its commonsense status shows that realism about the external world is true; rather, the fact that realism about the external world is true is what accounts for its commonsense status. In ethics, common sense regards the direct, intentional killing of an innocent human being as gravely immoral. But it is not that its commonsense status shows that such killing is immoral; rather, the fact that it is gravely immoral accounts for our intuitive sense that it is. And so forth. Nature has formed our feelings and intuitions so that they provide us with a rough and ready practical guide to what is true and good. But their intuitive status is a consequence of their being true and good, not the ground of their being true and good.

Making the distinction between moral ontology and moral epistemology appears to be warranted once again:

Moral ontology deals with whether a realm of objective moral values exists; in other words, "what is the basis for something being 'good' or 'evil'?" Moral epistemology deals with how we know what is good and evil. Clearly, one can have real objective moral values without knowing how we perceive these values or even how we know which actions are good and which are evil. I am not claiming that our perception of moral values is perfectly reliable. I argue that we have a very strong and reliable intuition that there are objective moral values; but I don't argue that our perceptions about which actions are good and which are evil are always accurate (in fact, I believe that in many cases our moral intuitions can be quite inaccurate). I am also not making the claim that one must believe in objective moral values in order to act morally. The question of whether the external, objective universe exist is a question of ontology; "Is there a real world that really exists outside of my own mind?" "Is there really a Macbook in front of me, or is this just a figment of my imagination?" This question, like the question of the existence of objective moral values, is independent of epistemology, namely, how we know that such a world exists. The objective external universe could exist, even if we have no reliable way to know that it exists. The external objective universe can exist even if my perception of facts about it are not always reliable. Consider the development of the natural sciences over the last four centuries. Scientists in the 17th century had incredibly poor and often erroneous ideas about the natural world. Since that time, our ideas have presumably become more and more accurate. But it does not follow that the objective universe does not exist or somehow depends upon our perception of it. In the same way, our perception of what is good and evil may change over time without affecting the claim that objective moral values exist. To clarify, by "objective" moral values and duties I mean: true, binding and independent of human belief.

Again, I ask, Scheavo: would it be objectively wrong for one to rape and kill a 4 year old child?

If they are conditional claims, then your claim that objective morals and values exist is not acceptable as True, and therefor everything you have been arguing no longer has a foundation. I gave you the benefit of the doubt, and assumed you're claiming consistent ideas. I apologize if that assumption was wrong.

To clarify, all I'm saying is that if God does not exist, objective moral values and duties do not exist. Yet if objective moral values and duties exist, God exists as God is the only logical and sound foundation for objective and binding moral values and duties which we would be obligated to follow with force of law.

Also, we obviously need to define "objectivity." The thing is, there is nothing you or I experience which is "objective." The degree to which I agree "objectivity" exists, is that I agree there is a World independent of either of us, a World which we share. Taking "objectivity" to mean this, then evolutionary theory clearly provides an objective way of understanding morals and values. Again, we can look at our DNA, we can look at our social history, we can look at our current social environments - all of these are objective features of the world which we can look at, and which provide insights and answers into morality and value. THe fact that it does not ground morality and value as something concrete is perhaps unfortunate, but you wanting there to be something more concrete doesn't change the fact that there doesn't appear to be anything concrete. You wanting something to be true, does not make said thing true.

Of course, Scheavo. Evolution can explain, perhaps, why natural selection has deemed it beneficial for us to act morally, but evolution would not be able to provide a sound foundation for objective moral values and duties which we both want to affirm. Evolution may be able to tell us, for example, that raping and murdering is not conducive to one's own survivability, but it in no way would be able to tell us that it is objectively wrong or "evil" to do so. There would be no reason to think that what is conducive to one's survivability or that of his species is objectively good in an atheistic worldview (or to think that what is not conducive to a species is "wrong" or "bad"). As Hume pointed out (turns out Hume actually got some things right  ), we cannot get an ought from an is. For example: The "is" in the case of rape would be "it is not beneficial to the survivability of an individual of a species to rape other members of the same species." The "ought" would be "Therefore, we ought not rape members of our species." We cannot derive objective values from scientific facts. At best we could say that we "don't like" rape, but there is no reason to think, given naturalism, that rape is objectively wrong in any sense. By trying to derive an ought from an is, one is merely committing the naturalistic fallacy.

Nope. Go look at quantum mechanics. Nothing is certain, everything is probabilistic, our and perception of reality effects and changes reality. I give you, the Quantum Zeno Effect. You cannot understand this observable effect clinging to the old concepts of "object" and "subject." The two are merged. Neither you or I have ever directly experienced anything which falls under the classic definition of an object, because everything we experience is a fabrication of our own minds.

What may have been unclear, was my definitions of these terms, which I (loosely) provided above.

There's somewhere in the vicinity of around 11 different interpretations of quantum mechanics models and theories, but the science lesson is appreciated, Scheavo. If you'd like to somehow relate this to the discussion of objective moral values, full steam ahead, commander, but I'm not seeing the correlation between the two.

[Omega]

Nietzsche said of himself that he had passed through nihilism. Are you going to honestly doubt the words of a man regarding his personal belief? He said you must pass through Nihilism, just like Kierkegaard's passage through despair (*gasp*), and he clearly tried to posit values and a system of values whereby one COULD call someone evil, wrong, good, or just.

Didn't anyone tell Nietzsche that trying to formulate a system of values and duties from the hopeless wreckage of nihilism would be at best in vain, at worst a fundamentally deliberate exercise of ignorance to the harvest that nihilism itself reaped? In other words: let Nietzsche try to establish a system of duties and values all he wants, but if they don't have a sound objective and ontological foundation beyond the mere whims of mankind, his goals of doing so are destined for disaster.

What you're confusing, is the fact that Nietzsche couldn't use the system that was in place, the ideological framework which you vainly try to uphold, could not allow him to make these judgements. "The Truth is that there is no Truth," is also making the point that, if one assumes there to be truth, one is invariably lead to the conclusion that there is no Truth. Search for the truth, and you shall not find it. Just like, if you search for yourself, your soul, you will find nothing.

Of course you could! Nietzsche realized that objective moral values and duties could be grounded in God (indeed if God existed, then everything would owe its existence to Him). Yet Nietzsche did not believe in God and so, as a rational consequence, came to the conclusion that objective moral values and duties could not and did not exist. Morality, he thought (and correctly, I might add), is then nothing more than an illusion, a man-made construct, or a mere product of blind evolutionary forces which merely determined that its use would be productive to the survivability of the species. Yet we wouldn't then be obligated to act morally any more than we are obligated to the survivability of our species or to reproduce. Nothing would be prohibited nor obligated.

Ignore the quote, or what? That quote clearly demonstrates that not EVERYTHING is justified, justification comes through the effects. If you lower the temperature, then the action is not justified. To put it in Nietzchian terms, if you are the ebb of this great flood, then you failed, then you did not succeed.

That's what I was saying, though. Why think, if objective moral values and duties do not exist, that "lowering the temperature" is not justified? Why think that anything at all is not justified? Why think that to not succeed is objectively wrong? I see no reason to think so.

LOL. Ya, it was a failure only to Nietzsche... which is exactly why so many philosophers and thinkers since have used this framework. Like, ya know, Sartre and Camus, those other philosophers you said people should read.

You know what I meant. It was an unstrategic use of of the word only, I admit. Of course there's others who've rejected theism. Just as there are those who've rejected atheism, etc.

Quantum mechanics works upon the principle of "killing God," - if God does not play with dice, then the fact that the universe plays with dice, means that there is no God.

You're gonna have to develop that a bit more (although I am at a loss to see how it is relevant to the discussion of the objectivity of moral values and duties). It reeks of wayward teleology, though.


Scheavo, I have to press you, though, because (I believe) I've not received a answer that must be established so as to understand your position better: is morality objective? (Do you hold that objective morality exists or does not exit?)

If there is no God, then any reason for regarding the herd morality evolved by homo-sapiens on this planet as objectively true seems to have been removed.

But that's not the argument. The argument is there we have developed a herd morality, which is objectively true. The morality which springs from it is not objectively true, as you would want to define it. I have on problem with the consequences this brings, becuase there are a host of other reasons why I shall still believe the morality that I believe, will still consult my moral intuition, etc. Lastly, if you read what I just posited to you, you'll notice that morality is NOT UP to individual persons opinions. It is up to genetics, society and one's upbringing. That is outside of oneself, one does not control that.

Exactly; if morality is the product of evolution, then there's no reason to think that such morality would be objective and binding nor would there be any reason to think that we are obligated to act within the confines of the "morality" that natural selection has determined would be advantageous to humans. It would not be smart or advantageous to become a serial killer, but under such a view, there's nothing really wrong with becoming a serial killer anyway.

So all that stuff at the end, not only do I see no problem with it, but I see no reason to think that there's a problem with it. Just becuase the world isn't as I wish it to  be, doesn't mean that the world is wrong. You having a dilemma and a problem with there not being something objectively True, especially regarding morality, doesn't mean jack shit. Sorry.

Hmm... If only I could know what "stuff at the end" you're referring to.

First, natural science tells us only what is, not what ought to be, the case. Science is about facts, not norms; it might tell us how we are, but it wouldn’t tell us what is wrong with how we are. In particular it cannot tell us that we have a moral obligation to take actions which are conducive to human flourishing.

I agree with the first part, I disagree with the last sentence. The thing is, science tells us that what is, is perspective morals.

To begin with, what do you mean by "perspective morals"? And as for the last sentence; again, science may be able to tell us what actions we can take for the betterment of the survivability of our species, but it cannot tell us what actions we should take nor does it place any obligations upon us to do so. This is the same is/ought naturalistic fallacy problem. Furthermore, if evolution is the foundation for morality and what is for the betterment to the survivability of our species is what is "good," then wouldn't actions such as eugenics, forcible genetic mutation, human culling to eliminate undesirable genetic traits, and genocide to alleviate overpopulation all be warranted and considered "good"? Would we not have an obligation to do so? Also, why think that the morality that evolution has determined conducive for is objective in any way? There's good reason to think otherwise, as I've said; if we were to rewind the film of evolution and play it again, a creature with very different moral values and duties could have emerged instead of humans. For example, had natural selection determined it advantageous for humans to develop along the societal structure similar to that of hive-insect analogues, we could imagine that killing our brothers or offspring (or whatever) would be morally admirable. Thus our "morality" is merely arbitrary. And why think that humans have any moral worth? Why think that what is conducive to us is any more valuable than what is conducive to cheetahs or ants?

Natural science clearly tells us that your worldview is untenable, that it is not.

Again, you need to develop this idea for me to respond in a meaningful manner. Making bare assertions such as this usually end up helping no one in a conversation.

Science can tell us why we feel the moral obligation to help our fellow humans flourish.

Precisely, but as I've stated before just two or so comments above (and before that, as well), science does not and cannot morally obligate us to pursue actions that would help humans flourish.

The fact that we all feel that same moral obligation is for you a sign of God, for me, and for scientific inquiry, it's because of evolution and social upbringing. Now, considering the fact's support my hypothesis, and don't give you hypothesis one ounce of support, I'm gonna go ahead and say that, regardless of how problematic my hypothesis may be (which I'll agree has trouble), it's a thousand times better than a hypothesis with absolutely no foundation and no reason to imagine is true.

Why think that what evolution and social upbringing has determined to "morality" is objectively true? I see no reason to think so, as I've explained ad nauseum.

What we "ought" to do, regarding novel situations, is subjective. I can consult my reasoning, my own intuition, and come to a conclusion that I feel is right - and then I can try and argue for other people to see the same thing. This is the role of philosophy, to try and determine what we ought to do. By consulting your moral intuition, you are not simply saying, "what is it that I believe?", you are consulting the billions of years of evolution, and the society you currently live in.

If naturalism and evolution are true and evolution favors survival value, then the likelihood of our cognitive faculties being reliable should be extremely low because natural selection doesn't favor true propositions, it favors reliable propositions based on the necessity of survival.

We both completely agree that moral intuition is how we come to our moral conclusions.

Perhaps, but not necessarily, as I've explained above.

Now, we have different ontologies for moral intuition, so let's compare those:

Your ontology for moral intuition is grounded in God, and that this provides us with an objectively, universal moral guide. This position hinges upon the existence of God, the conditional you have already made clear. Since we don't know the answer to this question, we really cant' go any farther than this, and the position is epistemologically unsound (meaning, we cannot know the answer).

My argument is simple: if objective moral values and duties exist, then God exists. If God does not exist, then objective moral values and duties do not exist (note that the argument is not: if objective moral values and duties do not exist, then God does not exist).

However, it's worth noting, as I already have, that people come to different conclusions regarding what is morally acceptable. This is an obvious fact, and to contend this is to start contending that the sky is blue. This obvious fact is also a direct challenge to the idea that moral intuition is universal, which pretty much falsifies your theory.

Of course it doesn't. I've spoken on intuitions and such extensively above (or in my last post I should say; it appears that I'm going to need to separate this post since I've passed the character limit).
 

My ontology for moral intuition is grounded in evolutionary theory.

Evolution is no sound ontological foundation for objective moral values and duties. Evolution can at best only explain why we are biologically inclined to take some actions and not others but it doesn't and cannot place any objective values nor obligations.

This theory does not present universal morals, it provides perspective morals, and how those morals came to be.

I'm sure I've asked before, but what exactly do you mean by prespective morals?

My theory hinges upon the veracity of evolutionary theory, as opposed to yours being upon God's existence. Now, the thing is, there is a massive amount of empirical and objective data to back up evolutionary theory. We have witnessed evolution occurring, on more than one occasion - and not just micro evolution. Evolutionary theory has an incredible power of explanation, it has helped us explain facts about the world that are otherwise unexplainable.

I don't doubt evolution theory. It simply is no sound foundation for objective moral values and duties.

This theory explains why people come up with different conclusions when consulting their moral intuition, as in, it gives an answer to the question of evil.

I feel I've addressed moral intuitions rather exhaustively. So what do you mean by "answer to the question of evil"?

[Scheavo]

You may know that, I may feel the same thing - but it is quite evidently clear that not everyone believes this. Otherwise, there would never be cases of a 4 yeard old getting raped and murdered. It's almost like you're ignoring the problem of evil.

Furthermore, as I just demonstrated, moral intuition is not the same as saying there is "objectively true" morals and values.

Think I've already clearly answered how moral intuition is not objective. Go ask a psychopath to consult their moral intuition. If moral intuition was the method by which we can determine objective morals exist, then people would not disagree about what is moral when consulting their intuitions.

I never said I do distrust our moral intuitions. I in fact said just the opposite, and grounded my moral epistemology (there I am actually talking about a moral epistemology) in moral intuition. You are simply making the mistake of equating moral intuition, with God.

The reason why, by and large, humans agree about what is moral, is becuase share evolutionary history, including genetic and social. Again, this does not cast objectivity out the window, it does not simply say, "whatever you desire to be moral, is moral." In fact, what you're proposing, that we can simply consult our moral intuitions to determine objective morality, means pyschopaths and other persons will commit atrocious crimes, becuase that's what their moral intuition tells them.

Our intuitions that tell us that objective moral values and duties do exist are as fallible as our sensory intuitions that tell us that the external world exists. So are we justified in concluding that the external world doesn't exist when our senses fail us or when they provide inaccurate information of the external world? Of course not! Just as our sensory intuitions may fail us or even be largely absent (Helen Keller; being blind, deaf, unable to smell, unable to feel, etc), so can our moral intuitions fail us and be largely absent. Yet we are no more justified in coming to the conclusion that, because our moral intuitions may fail us, objective moral values and duties do not exist just as much as we would not be justified in concluding that because our sensory intuitions fail us, the external world does not exist. Obviously there are people who lack moral intuitions altogether or others whose intuitions fail them and lead them to see an immoral act such as rape or murder as permissible. But without objective moral values and duties, we would not be able to condemn one such person who views murder as permissible because morality would then become a simple matter of taste or a social convention such as preferring to drive on the left side of street rather than on the left. In metaphysics, common sense regards skepticism about the external world as absurd. Yet it is not that its commonsense status shows that realism about the external world is true; rather, the fact that realism about the external world is true is what accounts for its commonsense status. In ethics, common sense regards the direct, intentional killing of an innocent human being as gravely immoral. But it is not that its commonsense status shows that such killing is immoral; rather, the fact that it is gravely immoral accounts for our intuitive sense that it is. And so forth. Nature has formed our feelings and intuitions so that they provide us with a rough and ready practical guide to what is true and good. But their intuitive status is a consequence of their being true and good, not the ground of their being true and good.

Everything you just said is explainable by how I define moral intuition.

Also, since you bring up the senses, you've just given me a huge favor. We all see color, yes? Well, what is color? It's not something objectively true, color is an interpretation of something we can point to, and we can both study it and agree it's the same wavelength of light. But the thing we all experience, the thing we all point to and talk about is not objectively there.

Combine this with evolution, the negative consequences of immoral actions in a communal society (because let's not forget, there are animal societies which are more or less solitary), and you have your objective event which gives rise  to said interpretation.

So you are correct in saying that our senses point to something, but you are not correct in saying that our senses point to something "objectively true."

I'm just gonna ignore your epistemology and ontology thing. At this point, I'm arguing with you that the sky is indeed blue.

Again, I ask, Scheavo: would it be objectively wrong for one to rape and kill a 4 year old child?

The question doesn't make proper sense. I can tell you what would objectively happen to someone if they raped and killed a 4 year old child, and were found out. They'd be dead. I can also give you objective reasons for why this is going to be true.

Also, we obviously need to define "objectivity." The thing is, there is nothing you or I experience which is "objective." The degree to which I agree "objectivity" exists, is that I agree there is a World independent of either of us, a World which we share. Taking "objectivity" to mean this, then evolutionary theory clearly provides an objective way of understanding morals and values. Again, we can look at our DNA, we can look at our social history, we can look at our current social environments - all of these are objective features of the world which we can look at, and which provide insights and answers into morality and value. THe fact that it does not ground morality and value as something concrete is perhaps unfortunate, but you wanting there to be something more concrete doesn't change the fact that there doesn't appear to be anything concrete. You wanting something to be true, does not make said thing true.

Of course, Scheavo. Evolution can explain, perhaps, why natural selection has deemed it beneficial for us to act morally, but evolution would not be able to provide a sound foundation for objective moral values and duties which we both want to affirm. Evolution may be able to tell us, for example, that raping and murdering is not conducive to one's own survivability, but it in no way would be able to tell us that it is objectively wrong or "evil" to do so. There would be no reason to think that what is conducive to one's survivability or that of his species is objectively good in an atheistic worldview (or to think that what is not conducive to a species is "wrong" or "bad"). As Hume pointed out (turns out Hume actually got some things right  ), we cannot get an ought from an is. For example: The "is" in the case of rape would be "it is not beneficial to the survivability of an individual of a species to rape other members of the same species." The "ought" would be "Therefore, we ought not rape members of our species." We cannot derive objective values from scientific facts. At best we could say that we "don't like" rape, but there is no reason to think, given naturalism, that rape is objectively wrong in any sense. By trying to derive an ought from an is, one is merely committing the naturalistic fallacy.

I think I know what the problem is. You mistakenly think humans are free, that we have the sort of free will necessary in christian morality. However, that is not objectively true either. We are not free, at least not in regards to this. Someone cannot simply cast away their genetics and their social upbringing, because their genetics and social upbringings is them.


Now, I still think there's a sense of choice in our lives, but it's not the kind of free will you rely upon. I definitely don't think I have any choice regarding my moral intuition, and thus how I feel and react to immoral actions. It doesn't really matter if I know that my feelings are not "ultimately true," becuase even knowing that, I still ultimately feel them as true.  I agree with where you conclusions lead, but I don't see how they make any ounce of difference. Know much about pragmatism?

Nope. Go look at quantum mechanics. Nothing is certain, everything is probabilistic, our and perception of reality effects and changes reality. I give you, the Quantum Zeno Effect. You cannot understand this observable effect clinging to the old concepts of "object" and "subject." The two are merged. Neither you or I have ever directly experienced anything which falls under the classic definition of an object, because everything we experience is a fabrication of our own minds.

What may have been unclear, was my definitions of these terms, which I (loosely) provided above.

There's somewhere in the vicinity of around 11 different interpretations of quantum mechanics models and theories, but the science lesson is appreciated, Scheavo. If you'd like to somehow relate this to the discussion of objective moral values, full steam ahead, commander, but I'm not seeing the correlation between the two.

You say our senses tell us there is an objective world outside ourselves. I've just demonstrated how that is not verifiable. The "objective" world around us, seems to be what it is becuase of our perception of it. I'm falsifying the entire basis for your philosophy.

[Scheavo]

Scheavo, I have to press you, though, because (I believe) I've not received a answer that must be established so as to understand your position better: is morality objective? (Do you hold that objective morality exists or does not exit?)

NO. It's perspectivalism, from German Idealism. The tradition that started with Kant, the person who "killed God" 240 years ago, decisively showing that the objectivity you desire is impossible to know, that what we can know is what is, and what is is perspective, and not a window unto reality. The tradition which Neitzsche is in, as well as Husserl, and Heidegger. And ultimately, modern physics, which was by and large formulated and conceived by German scientists and philosophers. So, unless you can overturn modern science, you're theory is completely unsound to hold as knowledge. As a matter of belief? Why not

Maybe you'll read that. Anyways, I'm done. It's somewhat been entertaining. I'm an existentialists, so I guess you could say it was better to think about this than something else, but if you choose not to read what I say, or choose not to try to understand what I say, I'm gonna have to say this is really not worth my time. I have on problems with discussing problems with it, as a skeptic I believe there has to be problems with it, and I think you have a very rational system. It's just, you ignore so much counter evidence, and don't seem willing to actually try to understand the opposing argument. This isn't just my opinion now, you've just articulated it for me in words, by repeating to ask me a question which I have thoroughly and repeatedly answered for you. It's the entire damn thread, and many more.

[Omega]

You may know that, I may feel the same thing - but it is quite evidently clear that not everyone believes this. Otherwise, there would never be cases of a 4 yeard old getting raped and murdered. It's almost like you're ignoring the problem of evil.

Furthermore, as I just demonstrated, moral intuition is not the same as saying there is "objectively true" morals and values.

Think I've already clearly answered how moral intuition is not objective. Go ask a psychopath to consult their moral intuition. If moral intuition was the method by which we can determine objective morals exist, then people would not disagree about what is moral when consulting their intuitions.

I never said I do distrust our moral intuitions. I in fact said just the opposite, and grounded my moral epistemology (there I am actually talking about a moral epistemology) in moral intuition. You are simply making the mistake of equating moral intuition, with God.

The reason why, by and large, humans agree about what is moral, is becuase share evolutionary history, including genetic and social. Again, this does not cast objectivity out the window, it does not simply say, "whatever you desire to be moral, is moral." In fact, what you're proposing, that we can simply consult our moral intuitions to determine objective morality, means pyschopaths and other persons will commit atrocious crimes, becuase that's what their moral intuition tells them.

Our intuitions that tell us that objective moral values and duties do exist are as fallible as our sensory intuitions that tell us that the external world exists. So are we justified in concluding that the external world doesn't exist when our senses fail us or when they provide inaccurate information of the external world? Of course not! Just as our sensory intuitions may fail us or even be largely absent (Helen Keller; being blind, deaf, unable to smell, unable to feel, etc), so can our moral intuitions fail us and be largely absent. Yet we are no more justified in coming to the conclusion that, because our moral intuitions may fail us, objective moral values and duties do not exist just as much as we would not be justified in concluding that because our sensory intuitions fail us, the external world does not exist. Obviously there are people who lack moral intuitions altogether or others whose intuitions fail them and lead them to see an immoral act such as rape or murder as permissible. But without objective moral values and duties, we would not be able to condemn one such person who views murder as permissible because morality would then become a simple matter of taste or a social convention such as preferring to drive on the left side of street rather than on the left. In metaphysics, common sense regards skepticism about the external world as absurd. Yet it is not that its commonsense status shows that realism about the external world is true; rather, the fact that realism about the external world is true is what accounts for its commonsense status. In ethics, common sense regards the direct, intentional killing of an innocent human being as gravely immoral. But it is not that its commonsense status shows that such killing is immoral; rather, the fact that it is gravely immoral accounts for our intuitive sense that it is. And so forth. Nature has formed our feelings and intuitions so that they provide us with a rough and ready practical guide to what is true and good. But their intuitive status is a consequence of their being true and good, not the ground of their being true and good.

Everything you just said is explainable by how I define moral intuition.

Which you haven't even defined. You simple tried to show that our moral intuitions are fallible and therefore not objective, but that didn't quite work. Again, the intuitive status of moral values and duties is a consequence of their being true and good, not the ground of their being true and good. In other words, our intuitions are the stopping point for our moral values and duties; they are only a sense through which we can glimpse the moral realm that is so evidently clear to us. Just as our sensory intuitions are not the ground of the external world, as are our moral intuitions not the ground for their objectivity. This comment of yours appears to be nothing but a blind assertion; a rhetorical trick to somehow "show" that you are "right."

Also, since you bring up the senses, you've just given me a huge favor.

Why does this reek of foul, odorous rhetoric?

We all see color, yes? Well, what is color? It's not something objectively true, color is an interpretation of something we can point to, and we can both study it and agree it's the same wavelength of light. But the thing we all experience, the thing we all point to and talk about is not objectively there.

Of course it is there. Color is merely a reflection of a particular wavelength of light. But what does this have to do with what we've been discussing? The number of red herrings in this post are making me nauseous.

Combine this with evolution, the negative consequences of immoral actions in a communal society (because let's not forget, there are animal societies which are more or less solitary), and you have your objective event which gives rise to said interpretation.

So "morality" is nothing more but a subjective interpretation of what actions should or should not be taken, with no force of law and no attributable obligation?

So you are correct in saying that our senses point to something, but you are not correct in saying that our senses point to something "objectively true."

Oof. More on this later, but what you are suggesting is just shocking.

I'm just gonna ignore your epistemology and ontology thing. At this point, I'm arguing with you that the sky is indeed blue.

Yes, just ignore the subject altogether. I wouldn't want to have to try to explain the difference between moral ontology and moral epistemology once again.

Again, I ask, Scheavo: would it be objectively wrong for one to rape and kill a 4 year old child?

The question doesn't make proper sense. I can tell you what would objectively happen to someone if they raped and killed a 4 year old child, and were found out. They'd be dead. I can also give you objective reasons for why this is going to be true.

Of course it makes sense, Scheavo. You're just trying to evade giving a straight answer. We all know what would happen to such a person if that person gets caught. That's why I didn't ask you "what do you think would happen to such man as a result?" We want to know why there would be unanimously negative reaction toward such a crime by all humanity. The question is whether what such a man did objectively wrong wrong or not. Your evasion of the question is, ultimately, telling of your desire to avoid revealing the utter uselessness of your moral landscape.

I think I know what the problem is. You mistakenly think humans are free, that we have the sort of free will necessary in christian morality. However, that is not objectively true either. We are not free, at least not in regards to this. Someone cannot simply cast away their genetics and their social upbringing, because their genetics and social upbringings is them.


Now, I still think there's a sense of choice in our lives, but it's not the kind of free will you rely upon. I definitely don't think I have any choice regarding my moral intuition, and thus how I feel and react to immoral actions. It doesn't really matter if I know that my feelings are not "ultimately true," becuase even knowing that, I still ultimately feel them as true.  I agree with where you conclusions lead, but I don't see how they make any ounce of difference. Know much about pragmatism?

You're really willing to rob us of free will in order to justify your moral landscape? If we really don't have free will and our actions are merely determined by our socio-evolutionary history or if our choices are the mere result of random electro-chemical reactions of neurons in our brains, then how could we ever even be able to condemn others for "crimes" which they wouldn't have been able to have chosen to commit?

Nope. Go look at quantum mechanics. Nothing is certain, everything is probabilistic, our and perception of reality effects and changes reality. I give you, the Quantum Zeno Effect. You cannot understand this observable effect clinging to the old concepts of "object" and "subject." The two are merged. Neither you or I have ever directly experienced anything which falls under the classic definition of an object, because everything we experience is a fabrication of our own minds.

What may have been unclear, was my definitions of these terms, which I (loosely) provided above.

There's somewhere in the vicinity of around 11 different interpretations of quantum mechanics models and theories, but the science lesson is appreciated, Scheavo. If you'd like to somehow relate this to the discussion of objective moral values, full steam ahead, commander, but I'm not seeing the correlation between the two.

You say our senses tell us there is an objective world outside ourselves. I've just demonstrated how that is not verifiable. The "objective" world around us, seems to be what it is becuase of our perception of it. I'm falsifying the entire basis for your philosophy.

Never mind that you haven't even explained the practical correlation with this supposed Zeno effect and our practical lives or moral intuitions; put to one side whether the physics of such an event are indeed correct; ignore the fact that what one "perceives" of this world could be used to justify moral atrocities; just savor the implications of your worldview: skepticism of the external world. Far from undermining my worldview, Scheavo, I think you've tripped and impaled yourself on this double edged sword.

[Omega]

Scheavo, I have to press you, though, because (I believe) I've not received a answer that must be established so as to understand your position better: is morality objective? (Do you hold that objective morality exists or does not exit?)

NO. It's perspectivalism, from German Idealism.

Which you haven't even come close to explaining adequately, never mind providing a defense of it or establishing how such a system could even lead to binding and obligatory moral values and duties with force of law.

The tradition that started with Kant, the person who "killed God" 240 years ago, decisively showing that the objectivity you desire is impossible to know, that what we can know is what is, and what is is perspective, and not a window unto reality. The tradition which Neitzsche is in, as well as Husserl, and Heidegger. And ultimately, modern physics, which was by and large formulated and conceived by German scientists and philosophers. So, unless you can overturn modern science, you're theory is completely unsound to hold as knowledge. As a matter of belief? Why not

Yes, the old "if you disagree with me, you're disagreeing with science, don't-ya-know?! Are you saying you disagree with modern science? Ha!" rhetoric.

Maybe you'll read that. Anyways, I'm done. It's somewhat been entertaining. I'm an existentialists, so I guess you could say it was better to think about this than something else, but if you choose not to read what I say, or choose not to try to understand what I say, I'm gonna have to say this is really not worth my time. I have on problems with discussing problems with it, as a skeptic I believe there has to be problems with it, and I think you have a very rational system. It's just, you ignore so much counter evidence, and don't seem willing to actually try to understand the opposing argument. This isn't just my opinion now, you've just articulated it for me in words, by repeating to ask me a question which I have thoroughly and repeatedly answered for you. It's the entire damn thread, and many more.

Existentialism is nothing but a vain and misconceived attempt to force meaning, purpose and moral values and duties in world completely absent from all. In a godless universe, there can be no objective moral values or duties, there can be no objective meaning, no purpose, no hope for humanity. We are all destined to death. Our civilization, our progresses, our achievements, our buildings, or diplomatic feats, our works of art, our cultures -- our human plight -- all meaningless and purposeless in the scheme of reality. For all these actions are in vain. If our own sun does not swallow whole our entire civilization, the heat death of the universe will be our inevitable end.

if there is no God, then there can be no objective standards of right and wrong. All we are confronted with is, in Jean-Paul Sartre’s words, the bare, valueless fact of existence. Moral values are either just expressions of personal taste or the by-products of sociobiological evolution and conditioning. In the words of one humanist philosopher, “The moral principles that govern our behavior are rooted in habit and custom, feeling and fashion.” In a world without God, who is to say which values are right and which are wrong? Who is to judge that the values of Adolf Hitler are inferior to those of a saint? The concept of morality loses all meaning in a universe without God. As one contemporary atheistic ethicist points out, “to say that something is wrong because . . . it is forbidden by God, is. . . perfectly understandable to anyone who believes in a law-giving God. But to say that something is wrong . . . even though no God exists to forbid it, is not understandable. . . .” “The concept of moral obligation[is] unintelligible apart from the idea of God. The words remain but their meaning is gone.” In a world without God, there can be no objective right and wrong, only our culturally and personally relative, subjective judgments. This means that it is impossible to condemn war, oppression, or crime as evil. Nor can one praise brotherhood, equality, and love as good. For in a universe without God, good and evil do not exist—there is only the bare valueless fact of existence, and there is no one to say you are right and I am wrong.

Scientists tell us that the universe is expanding, and everything in it is growing farther and farther apart. As it does so, it grows colder and colder, and its energy is used up. Eventually all the stars will burn out and all matter will collapse into dead stars and black holes. There will be no light at all; there will be no heat; there will be no life; only the corpses of dead stars and galaxies, ever expanding into the endless darkness and the cold recesses of space—a universe in ruins. The entire universe marches irreversibly toward its grave. So not only is the life of each individual person doomed; the entire human race is doomed. The universe is plunging toward inevitable extinction—death is written throughout its structure. There is no escape. There is no hope.

If each individual person passes out of existence when he dies, then what ultimate meaning can be given to his life? Does it really matter whether he ever existed at all? It might be said that his life was important because it influenced others or affected the course of history. But this only shows a relative significance to his life, not an ultimate significance. His life may be important relative to certain other events, but what is the ultimate significance of any of those events? If all the events are meaningless, then what can be the ultimate meaning of influencing any of them? Ultimately it makes no difference. Look at it from another perspective: Scientists say that the universe originated in an explosion called the “Big Bang” about 15 billion years ago. Suppose the Big Bang had never occurred. Suppose the universe had never existed. What ultimate difference would it make? The universe is doomed to die anyway. In the end it makes no difference whether the universe ever existed or not. Therefore, it is without ultimate significance. The same is true of the human race. Mankind is a doomed race in a dying universe. Because the human race will eventually cease to exist, it makes no ultimate difference whether it ever did exist. Mankind is thus no more significant than a swarm of mosquitoes or a barnyard of pigs, for their end is all the same. The same blind cosmic process that coughed them up in the first place will eventually swallow them all again. And the same is true of each individual person. The contributions of the scientist to the advance of human knowledge, the researches of the doctor to alleviate pain and suffering, the efforts of the diplomat to secure peace in the world, the sacrifices of good men everywhere to better the lot of the human race—all these come to nothing. In the end they don’t make one bit of difference, not one bit. Each person’s life is therefore without ultimate significance. And because our lives are ultimately meaningless, the activities we fill our lives with are also meaningless. The long hours spent in study at the university, our jobs, our interests, our friendships—all these are, in the final analysis, utterly meaningless. This is the horror of modern man: because he ends in nothing, he is nothing.