What defenders of the cosmological argument do say is that what comes into existence has a cause, or that what is contingent has a cause. These claims are as different from “Everything has a cause” as “Whatever has color is extended” is different from “Everything is extended.” Defenders of the cosmological argument also provide arguments for these claims about causation. You may disagree with the claims – though if you think they are falsified by modern physics, you are sorely mistaken – but you cannot justly accuse the defender of the cosmological argument either of saying something manifestly silly or of contradicting himself when he goes on to say that God is uncaused.
How can you so calmly claim that the universe began to exist, or that the universe is contingent? And at the same time, claim that God is not contingent, and that God never began to exist? You're still not answering the question at hand, and you're just redefining terms to try and make it more logical, instead of dealing with the fundamental problem you're faced with.
Because there is an overwhelming amount of evidence that points to our universe beginning to exist. And, as I said, I'll address the popular "what caused God" objection in the next "part," if you will.
The bold part is the only thing that even closely deals with the arguments being presented to you on this forum, and the bold part isn't an argument, so much as your stated opinion. And to say sorely mistaken? I'm sorry, but for a claim like that - one that goes against expert physicists claims - I'm going to need proof, and at least an argument as to why. The only time you got this in depth about Quantum Mechanics and modern physics was to attack a strawman argument that isn't being made.
You are either arguing:
A.) Quantum mechanics proves that some events are uncaused.
Again, this is an abuse of science, perpetrated by many atheistic popularizers. You may go back to the thread to read (yet again) what I posted there
or
B.) We don't know why radiation (or some other event) occurs
A is a patently false objection to premise 1 of the Kalam and is an abuse of science (again, as I elaborated on the causality thread). If you think I need to further address this, then it would be my pleasure to in the near future. And, no, I don't what to hear what it is
you think what the appropriate philosophical definition of "nothing"
should be.
B is just a wonderful and unrelated musing on our failings in science. So what if we don't know what causes radiation to occur? Does that mean that radiation is uncaused? You're the one who's claiming that premise 1 of the kalam is false. You have to give an example of how things can come into being from non-being and then face the problem of why just
anything doesn't come into being.
Indeed, Sigz, the next non-serious objection is the "what caused God" objection.
Asking for an explanation of God's existence, or where does God come from, does not necessitate that we ask for a "cause" of God. As you'll notice, in the the form of the Leibniz argument you gave , which WLC defends, Leibniz says that everything which exists has an explanation. The argument is for why God exists, so he must have an explanation.
Good eye, there Scheavo (no, I'm not being sarcastic).
At first blush, premise 1 of Leibniz' argument seems very vulnerable in an obvious way: if everything that exists has an explanation for its existence, and God exists, then God must have an explanation for His existence. Yet that seems out of the question, for then the explanation for God's existence would be some other being greater than God. Since that is impossible (God is the greatest conceivable being; what can be greater than the greatest conceivable being? An infinite regress of God-creating-Gods?), premise 1 must be false. Some things must be able to exist without any explanation. The believer will simply say that God exists inexplicably. The unbeliever will say, "Why not stop with the universe? The universe just exists inexplicably." So a stalemate is reached.
Not too fast, though. This objection is born out of a misunderstanding of what Leibniz means by an "explanation." According to Leibniz, there are to kinds of things: 1.) Things that exist necessarily, and 2.) Things that are produced by some external cause.
1.) Things that exist necessarily exist by a necessity of their own nature. It's impossible for them
not to exist. Mathematicians think that numbers and other mathematical entities exist in this way; they're not caused to exist by something else. They just exist by the necessity of their own nature.
2.) In contrast, things that are caused to exist by something else don't exist necessarily; they exist because something else has produced them. Physical objects like planets, knifes, stars, etc, fall into this category.
So when Leibniz says that everything that exists has an explanation for its existence, the explanation may be found either in the necessity of a thing's nature or else in some external cause. So premise 1.) of Leibniz's argument could be better formulated:
1.) Everything that exists has an explanation of its existence, either in the necessity of its own nature or in an external cause.
But the objection is now defeated; the explanation for God's existence lies in the necessity of God's own nature. As even a sincere atheist will recognize, it's impossible for God to have a cause (more on that later). Leibniz's argument is really an argument for God as a necessary, uncaused being.