Judge orders Colorado woman to unencrypt laptop

[El Barto]

And just to be clear, that's me giving a constitutional argument. I'm not entirely sure where I stand, I much more agree with this

Of course,  that's easier said than done.  There are always gray areas,  and fuzzy lines like we're seeing here.  There isn't any well defined way of handling these things; only best judgement.

Computers and the internet bring about more social change than humans can keep up with. It'll be a while before this, piracy, and many other digital Right concerns, are resolved.

OK fine.  Does it make since to consider the cumulative consequences of that best judgement,  or do we decide each and every issue without considering where it leads us?  As I suggested earlier,  it's actually pretty damned difficult to take power back once it's allotted.  Once again, erring on the side of freedom is always a reasonable course.

[hefdaddy42]

If they can't prove that there is evidence on the laptop, then there is no evidence on her laptop.  They can't meet the burden of proof.

Isn't that like saying because you can't prove god exists, he doesn't exist? Or that because you can't prove god doesn't' exist, he does exist?

No.

[Orbert]

Yeah, I'm not seeing that connection either.  Legally, reality is what you can prove.  Faith has no such restriction, and is actually pretty much the opposite of requiring proof.

[Scheavo]

If they can't prove that there is evidence on the laptop, then there is no evidence on her laptop.  They can't meet the burden of proof.

Isn't that like saying because you can't prove god exists, he doesn't exist? Or that because you can't prove god doesn't' exist, he does exist?

No.

I'm fine with you saying there isn't enough evidence to convict, without being able to get on the laptop, but it's a huge leap from there to say that there is then "no evidence on her laptop."

I believe it's a fallacy, something like proof from negative or something, which is why I brought up the religious connection.

And just to be clear, that's me giving a constitutional argument. I'm not entirely sure where I stand, I much more agree with this

Of course,  that's easier said than done.  There are always gray areas,  and fuzzy lines like we're seeing here.  There isn't any well defined way of handling these things; only best judgement.

Computers and the internet bring about more social change than humans can keep up with. It'll be a while before this, piracy, and many other digital Right concerns, are resolved.

OK fine.  Does it make since to consider the cumulative consequences of that best judgement,  or do we decide each and every issue without considering where it leads us?

Well, we take up new technology without considering where it leads us, so in a sense, I'd say we're forced to deal with these things on a case by case issue. But what issue are you talking about exactly? Everything to do with our Rights and the internet/computer technology, or more specific to this kind of case? Because if the latter, I'd say that's already the case with search warrants, so I don't see how it's all that big of a leap to make the equivalent true for computer storage / property.

[El Barto]

Well, we take up new technology without considering where it leads us, so in a sense, I'd say we're forced to deal with these things on a case by case issue. But what issue are you talking about exactly? Everything to do with our Rights and the internet/computer technology, or more specific to this kind of case? Because if the latter, I'd say that's already the case with search warrants, so I don't see how it's all that big of a leap to make the equivalent true for computer storage / property.

Well,  again,  I'm not so sure the warrant thing is applicable here.  They already have what they were looking for,  they just need help or time to translate it.  Remember,  encryption isn't impenetrable.  It's merely time consuming. 

And something that hasn't been thrown into the mix here is that the only reason they're up shit creek is because they didn't bother to look forward during their investigation.  The thing that gives people the greatest pause here is that it would set a precedent where anybody could encrypt anything and it's like a get out of jail free card.  Truth is,  there are tons of back doors to be exploited.  If you know that what you're looking for is encrypted,  you get a warrant to plant a key logger,  or you install a camera to watch her log on,  or you wait until she's logged on and then cold boot her laptop.  There are ways of doing what they want,  as long as they're used in advance, and not after you've busted them.  Frankly,  the detectives fucked this up,  and now they're seeking her help to bail them out.

As for your question,  I'm kind of interested in seeing some precedent that says that a person is secure in their thoughts.  That's actually what this comes down to, IMO.  I really don't see any reason to start chipping away at a persons right to remain silent.  Again,  since this is a very fuzzy area,  I don't see it as strictly the provision of evidence.  I see it as equally pertinent to providing self incriminating testimony.  The two seem inseparable in this instance. 

BTW,  there actually is a precedent for your point of view in this.  Some dumbass let a border guard see some naughty pictures on his laptop coming back from Canada.  Before they could copy and log the evidence,  his laptop went into sleep mode and encrypted itself.  He naturally told them he had forgotten the key.  A judge ruled that in this case,  that evidence was in there was a foregone conclusion,  and therefore self incrimination was no longer a consideration.  Simply put,  he can't incriminate himself by providing what they already know.  That seems to be the basis of the judges decision here.  The problem is that it's not a foregone conclusion that anything on this woman's laptop will be evidence to nail her.  Since they don't really know exactly what the contents are,  they can't just assume them it to be non-incriminating.   

[Scheavo]

As for your question,  I'm kind of interested in seeing some precedent that says that a person is secure in their thoughts.  That's actually what this comes down to, IMO.  I really don't see any reason to start chipping away at a persons right to remain silent.  Again,  since this is a very fuzzy area,  I don't see it as strictly the provision of evidence.  I see it as equally pertinent to providing self incriminating testimony.  The two seem inseparable in this instance. 

See, where I draw the line is, say you're recording her giving you the encryption key, and you play that recording in trial. It would be completely irrelevant, and itself could not lead to any sort of conviction. As you point out, there could very well not be incriminating evidence on the laptop, just like there cannot be any incriminating evidence in a search the old fashion way.

To go back to the key example, that can also be considered part of your thoughts. You know where the key is, you know what key works, etc; and there, you are required to fess up your knowledge to give the key over, so that the search can continue. A pure protection of your thoughts would mean you aren't required to fork that key over (course, a safe is a lot easier to break into than an encrypted computer).

I guess I just don't see the big difference, in terms of privacy and our rights, between a keylogger, and asking her to hand over the information. Though, where I think I'm starting to agree with you is if you actually punish the women for remaining silent, contempt of court and whatnot. Overall, I think your points about the investigation being possibly done another way, where this kind of problem doesn't arise, is the most powerful.

This certainly is a conundrum though, specifically becuase of the possible "get out of jail free card."

[El Barto]

Like I said,  the get out of jail free card is somewhat moot,  since cops are almost certainly going to find a way to get your key without you being compelled to give it to them.  The guys in this case just sucked.

As for the safe analogy,  I still don't find it particularly apt.  What are your thoughts on the unknown language analogy?  If I invent a new language to conduct my naughty business in,  should I be compelled to teach it to the prosecution so they can convict me?  It seems to me that this is just as comparable a scenario.  The only difference is that a computer program was used to craft the language. 

[Scheavo]

Like I said,  the get out of jail free card is somewhat moot,  since cops are almost certainly going to find a way to get your key without you being compelled to give it to them.  The guys in this case just sucked.

Which is why I'm maybe leaning to oppose this order, because it would force law enforcement to handle the investigation better, thus basically making the conundrum sorta go away. There's a lot of time we have to throw out evidence because it was obtained illegally, and I've personally benefited from that myself. The pragmatist in me just cries out at this though, because it all gets so fucking similar in the end.

 I'm still not sure it's protected as the Constitution currently reads, however (and if you want to get into the discussion of how this should progress, I'd say the opinion of 9 people in the Supreme Court, especially the 9 we have now, is more worrisome than a legislative process).

As for the safe analogy,  I still don't find it particularly apt.  What are your thoughts on the unknown language analogy?  If I invent a new language to conduct my naughty business in,  should I be compelled to teach it to the prosecution so they can convict me?  It seems to me that this is just as comparable a scenario.  The only difference is that a computer program was used to craft the language.

I think the "only difference" is a big one though. We're talking about a rather small phrase, something more similar to a key than a full blown language. It's a keyword, that unlocks the encryption. That's a lot different than fully translating an entire language. But no, I don't think it would be fair to say that someone has to help the investigators crack your secret langauge.

[El Barto]

Looks like it's showtime.  The Fifth Circuit pretty much told her to GTFO, and the original judge has given her until Monday to turn over and unencrypted version of her hard drive.

Her attorney has suggested that she intends to comply with the court's order, but also hinted that she might not have any clue what the password is, due to either her forgetting, or the encryption being set up by another party (presumably her husband).  This poses yet another issue.  What if the woman truly doesn't know the password?  Is it reasonable to hold her in a cell until she turns over information that she actually doesn't have?

My guess is that they'll put the laptop in front of her,  she'll confidently type in a 14 character key, then look puzzled when it won't work.  Try again a couple of times and then tell them she did her best, now what.  Now what?

[Orbert]

Is it one of those systems where if you type in the wrong password too many times, it locks up?  That would be cool.  Intentionally blow it five times or whatever, then show everyone the message on screen that clearly says that it's locked up and can only be opened by... Chuck Norris?  I don't know how that kind of thing works.

[kirksnosehair]

Is it one of those systems where if you type in the wrong password too many times, it locks up?  That would be cool.  Intentionally blow it five times or whatever, then show everyone the message on screen that clearly says that it's locked up and can only be opened by... Chuck Norris?  I don't know how that kind of thing works.

Hmm,  that's a good point.  I have a Kanguru Defender Basic 256-bit AES Encrypted Flash Drive that will literally self-destruct if you put in the wrong password 5 times in a row.  That's actually a very common feature now with a lot of encryption schemes.

Still haven't heard back from Harvey (my lawyer friend), but I know he's busy with a murder appeal right now.

[El Barto]

Is it one of those systems where if you type in the wrong password too many times, it locks up?  That would be cool.  Intentionally blow it five times or whatever, then show everyone the message on screen that clearly says that it's locked up and can only be opened by... Chuck Norris?  I don't know how that kind of thing works.

Hmm,  that's a good point.  I have a Kanguru Defender Basic 256-bit AES Encrypted Flash Drive that will literally self-destruct if you put in the wrong password 5 times in a row.  That's actually a very common feature now with a lot of encryption schemes.

Just because it's scrambled doesn't mean that it can't be copied.  As one of your colleagues suggested in your article, cloning the drive would be SOP before trying to get anything out of it.  With a USB drive it'd be more difficult since you probably can't even mount the thing, but with a basic HDD it shouldn't be too much trouble at all for an actual forensics lab.  Hell, if they can pull the data out of powered-down ram, this should be a snap.  With the data copied, there's no risk of it self destructing.

Also, if they know what program encrypted the drive, and the bootloader should tell them that, then they can probably emulate it without the multiple attempt safeguards.  I'm not even sure they'd need to emulate the actual software.  They might just need to know which algorithm was used. 

[Scheavo]

due to either her forgetting, or the encryption being set up by another party (presumably her husband). 

That would actually solve the entire issue though. Then the third party just gets subpoenaed, and this was all for nothing.

My guess is that they'll put the laptop in front of her,  she'll confidently type in a 14 character key, then look puzzled when it won't work.  Try again a couple of times and then tell them she did her best, now what.  Now what?

At what point do lie detectors become acceptable? When the judge asks how they plea, it's theoretically possible for us to know for certain whether that person is lying or not, and not the polygraph.

[El Barto]

My guess is that they'll put the laptop in front of her,  she'll confidently type in a 14 character key, then look puzzled when it won't work.  Try again a couple of times and then tell them she did her best, now what.  Now what?

At what point do lie detectors become acceptable? When the judge asks how they plea, it's theoretically possible for us to know for certain whether that person is lying or not, and not the polygraph.

That makes things even worse.  Now she truly is being forced to testify against herself, this time in a contempt of court charge.  You can argue that being ordered to fork over the key isn't self-incriminating, but I don't think you could make that claim if she's being forced to reveal whether or not she's lying to protect herself.

[Scheavo]

My guess is that they'll put the laptop in front of her,  she'll confidently type in a 14 character key, then look puzzled when it won't work.  Try again a couple of times and then tell them she did her best, now what.  Now what?

At what point do lie detectors become acceptable? When the judge asks how they plea, it's theoretically possible for us to know for certain whether that person is lying or not, and not the polygraph.

That makes things even worse.  Now she truly is being forced to testify against herself, this time in a contempt of court charge.  You can argue that being ordered to fork over the key isn't self-incriminating, but I don't think you could make that claim if she's being forced to reveal whether or not she's lying to protect herself.

Oh, I'm just bringing up hypotheticals. I know it's definitely unconstitutional, but there's nothing to say that can be changed, or that the Supreme Court doesn't find some insane ruling that somehow justifies it.  If technology can make it easier to hide some crimes, it can also make it much easier to ascertain guilt.

[kirksnosehair]

Is it one of those systems where if you type in the wrong password too many times, it locks up?  That would be cool.  Intentionally blow it five times or whatever, then show everyone the message on screen that clearly says that it's locked up and can only be opened by... Chuck Norris?  I don't know how that kind of thing works.

Hmm,  that's a good point.  I have a Kanguru Defender Basic 256-bit AES Encrypted Flash Drive that will literally self-destruct if you put in the wrong password 5 times in a row.  That's actually a very common feature now with a lot of encryption schemes.

Just because it's scrambled doesn't mean that it can't be copied.  As one of your colleagues suggested in your article, cloning the drive would be SOP before trying to get anything out of it.  With a USB drive it'd be more difficult since you probably can't even mount the thing, but with a basic HDD it shouldn't be too much trouble at all for an actual forensics lab.  Hell, if they can pull the data out of powered-down ram, this should be a snap.  With the data copied, there's no risk of it self destructing.

Also, if they know what program encrypted the drive, and the bootloader should tell them that, then they can probably emulate it without the multiple attempt safeguards.  I'm not even sure they'd need to emulate the actual software.  They might just need to know which algorithm was used.

Yep, clone first, then make a copy of your image, then always work with the copy.  Some encryption programs make cloning extremely difficult (PGP and TrueCrypt are a pain in the ass) but there are none that I am aware of that can outright stop a successful full forensic drive image from being created.  Once you have a forensic image you can keep making copies and try as many things as you like without risk.

[Nekov]

Well, I think the artcile states that the problem is not how to do it but the time it would take to do it.

And I completly agree with the judge here. A court should be able to ask someone to unencrypt their own computer if they have sufficient reasons to think that it holds important proof.

[El Barto]

And I completly agree with the judge here. A court should be able to ask someone to unencrypt their own computer if they have sufficient reasons to think that it holds important proof.

And I think that most of us would have a hard time refuting a practical statement like that.  The problem is that it might (or might not) run entirely afoul of our Constitution.  As you've seen in DTF, we tend to get pretty riled up about the Constitution up here (at least the parts that we like).

[Nekov]

Well, I'm not aware of what the constitution says about this but I think everyone should bear in mind that it was written hundreds of years ago when society was completley different and when all the technology that we have nowadays wasn't in anybodys mind so maybe the judges decision does go against what's currently written and in that case it should be revoked, or used as a starting point for getting the laws adjusted to the way the world is now.

[El Barto]

Well, I'm not aware of what the constitution says about this but I think everyone should bear in mind that it was written hundreds of years ago when society was completley different and when all the technology that we have nowadays wasn't in anybodys mind so maybe the judges decision does go against what's currently written and in that case it should be revoked, or used as a starting point for getting the laws adjusted to the way the world is now.

Certainly the authors of the Bill of Rights didn't have 256-bit encryption in mind, but the principle is sound regardless of the technology.  A person can't be made to bare witness against themselves.  It's straight forward, and it's a kick ass element of a free society.  Whether or not it's applicable in this case is a fascinating question, which none of us have quite figured out yet, but even the people who say it isn't would defend the principle vehemently. 

[Nekov]

That is a valid point but I don't see how asking for someone to unencrypt their hard drive is any different than asking someone to open the door to their house. In both cases it can be considered that doing it might lead the police into finding evidence yet no one argues that if the police comes into your house with a warrant from the judge you have to open the door.

[kirksnosehair]

That is a valid point but I don't see how asking for someone to unencrypt their hard drive is any different than asking someone to open the door to their house. In both cases it can be considered that doing it might lead the police into finding evidence yet no one argues that if the police comes into your house with a warrant from the judge you have to open the door.

Personally, I believe this analogy works well.  Same as the analogy with a safe.  Providing access to something is not the same as testifying against yourself.  The more I think about it, the more I think it will stand up to any constitutional challenges.

[Nick]

That is a valid point but I don't see how asking for someone to unencrypt their hard drive is any different than asking someone to open the door to their house. In both cases it can be considered that doing it might lead the police into finding evidence yet no one argues that if the police comes into your house with a warrant from the judge you have to open the door.

Personally, I believe this analogy works well.  Same as the analogy with a safe.  Providing access to something is not the same as testifying against yourself.  The more I think about it, the more I think it will stand up to any constitutional challenges.

While I agree with your side of the argument, the difference here is the police will say "Open the door or we'll break it down". If you carry that into your analogy we are now saying "Give us the code or we will throw you in jail until we break the encryption". We don't force people to open doors, we just open them ourselves if need be, and that isn't applicable in this case.

[kirksnosehair]

No analogy is going to map with 100% acuity to this situation, we can only give approximate examples, because this is a unique case based on relatively new circumstances.  But I do not believe that providing the password to an encrypted hard drive rises to the level of self-incrimination, just as I do not believe that providing the combination to a safe rises to that level.

And I'm pretty sure that's how the courts will end up ruling if this thing makes it to the federal appellate court.

[El Barto]

They're compelling her to assist in her own prosecution.  As far as I'm concerned we're under no obligation to do so.  Like I said before, sometimes the cost of a free society is not being able to burn somebody.  Such is life.

And there's still the equally important question of what happens if she forgot or destroyed the password.  Can you hold somebody for failing to turn over something they can't actually produce? 

And another issue I haven't brought up yet: an encrypted file/HDD looks exactly like a shredded file/HDD; bit after bit of perfectly random data.  That's one of TrueCrypt's big selling points; plausible deniability.  What happens if she says that it isn't encrypted but wiped?

Again, under either of those scenarios, it's not a key she's being asked to produce, but the contents of her own mind with regard to whether or not she's lying about having access to the key, or whether or not the drive is even encrypted.  There's no longer any question about how that relates to the 5th amendment. 

[kirksnosehair]

They're compelling her to assist in her own prosecution.  As far as I'm concerned we're under no obligation to do so.

The case boils down to whether or not the password is "testimonial" or not.  I do not believe it is and I do not believe the court will rule in her favor.

[El Barto]

They're compelling her to assist in her own prosecution.  As far as I'm concerned we're under no obligation to do so.

The case boils down to whether or not the password is "testimonial" or not.  I do not believe it is and I do not believe the court will rule in her favor.

I don't think it boils down to that one issue at all.  I'd say it's more a matter of whether or not you're obligated to assist the state in prosecuting you.  It's not impossible for the state to get the info, it's just a matter of severe inconvenience.  They want her help to expedite it.  Not her responsibility. 

And again, this wouldn't be an issue if they'd conducted their investigation better to begin with.  If you'd been in charge of this investigation, would you have busted her before ascertaining the encryption key?

[kirksnosehair]

I think the ABC news blog post about this case has both sides of the argument pretty fairly and equally represented.  Here's why I think she's going to have to give them the password.  Emphasis added by me:

The Fifth Amendment, among other things, protects people from being compelled to give from the content of their mind evidence against themselves – called “testimonial” evidence. The court can, however, compel one to give up “non-testimonial” evidence, which includes things like DNA, blood, voice and handwriting samples.
The analogy being argued then is this: Is a password more like a key to a lockbox (non-testimonial) or a combination to a safe (testimonial)? The law allows authorities to compel you to give up the key, but not the combination.
“The Fifth Amendment means the government can’t compel you to turn over testimonial information that would reveal the contents of your mind and tend to incriminate you,” Marcia Hofmann, a senior staff attorney at Electronic Frontier Foundation, which filed a brief in support of Fricosu, told ABC News. “A password is something you know, something that’s in your mind. It’s a different thing entirely than turning over a physical key.”
Prosecutors contend a password is more like a key, and if Fricosu doesn’t hand it over, it could set a dangerous precedent.
“Failing to compel Ms. Fricosu,” Assistant U.S. Attorney Patricia Davies wrote in a court filing, “amounts to concession to her and potential criminals (be it in child exploitation, national security, terrorism, financial crimes or drug trafficking cases) that encrypting all inculpatory digital evidence will serve to defeat the efforts of law enforcement officers … and thus make their prosecution impossible.”
Prosecutors also say it isn’t the password that matters to them, that they don’t even need to know it. It’s what’s behind the password that they care about. “The government seeks the strongbox’s contents,” Davies wrote, “not the ability to open the strongbox for itself.”

Now don't misunderstand where I'm coming from - my personal views are that she should not have to say anything.  After all, she does have the "Right to remain silent" and that right should be respected.  But with that said, I direct you to the portion of the above quote that I have made bold and I ask you:  Do you REALLY believe that in the age of terrorists flying planes into buildings that our courts are going to set this kind of precedent?

Maybe I'm just too cynical because of my personal history with the law, but I don't think they're going to open that can of worms. 

[El Barto]

What I believe is the right call and what the courts might eventually decide are two very different things.  As I recall, you share my disdain for the current judiciary. 

As for the bolded part of your article, I call bullshit for a variety of reasons.  First off, we already grant concessions for the sake of freedom, and hopefully we will continue to do so.  That's a very important thing in my book.  Second, it won't serve to defeat their efforts; only to force changes.  For one thing, there's no telling how much longer encryption will stay safe from efforts to crack it.  Just because it'll take twenty thousand years to brute force it today doesn't mean that it will five years from now.  There's also the fact that their cracking computer might luck out and get it on the third attempt.  How many people remained free for decades until the ability to test DNA became common place and allowed cold cases to be resolved? 

Also, I put a pretty simple question to you which you didn't address.  As somebody with experience in IT and investigations, would you have busted here before figuring out her encryption key?  Which is easier, obtaining her key through the back door, or knocking the front door down? 

[kirksnosehair]

I don't understand the question, rephrase it please.

[kirksnosehair]

What I believe is the right call and what the courts might eventually decide are two very different things.  As I recall, you share my disdain for the current judiciary. 

Yes, that is true.

As for the bolded part of your article, I call bullshit for a variety of reasons.  First off, we already grant concessions for the sake of freedom, and hopefully we will continue to do so.  That's a very important thing in my book.  Second, it won't serve to defeat their efforts; only to force changes.  For one thing, there's no telling how much longer encryption will stay safe from efforts to crack it.  Just because it'll take twenty thousand years to brute force it today doesn't mean that it will five years from now.  There's also the fact that their cracking computer might luck out and get it on the third attempt.  How many people remained free for decades until the ability to test DNA became common place and allowed cold cases to be resolved? 

I'm not really following your logic.   All I am saying is IF the courts allow this woman to NOT provide the password to the encryption, then what is to prevent (for example) child pornographers from transporting child pornography on encrypted hard drives?  After all, they cannot be compelled to reveal the passwords, right?  So there's no way for anyone to prove what's on the hard drives.  They could literally carry those hard drives around in a big huge panel truck that says "Child Porn" on the side of it and never be prosecuted.  (I'm being facetious but you know what I mean)

Also, I put a pretty simple question to you which you didn't address.  As somebody with experience in IT and investigations, would you have busted here before figuring out her encryption key?  Which is easier, obtaining her key through the back door, or knocking the front door down?

I still don't understand the question, but just to be clear:  I work for DEFENSE ATTORNEYS only. 

[TempusVox]

I don't believe this violates her 5a rights at all. It's simply a matter of the courts demaning that she turn over possible evidence. Regardless of whether that evidence is behind a locked file cabinet, in a safe, behind the door of secured safe room, or encrypted on a computer. It still has not violated her 5a rights in any way. She still has the right to refuse to testify, or answer questions regarding the evidence, but she cannot hide evidence, or refuse to comply with a subpeona of that possible evidence.

[El Barto]

I don't believe this violates her 5a rights at all. It's simply a matter of the courts demaning that she turn over possible evidence. Regardless of whether that evidence is behind a locked file cabinet, in a safe, behind the door of secured safe room, or encrypted on a computer. It still has not violated her 5a rights in any way. She still has the right to refuse to testify, or answer questions regarding the evidence, but she cannot hide evidence, or refuse to comply with a subpeona of that possible evidence.

She turned over the evidence they asked for and it's now in their possession.  What they want is her help in decoding it because they don't want to take the time to do in themselves.  Again, just because it could theoretically take a trillion, trillion years to crack the girl's encryption, doesn't mean that it might not take five minutes. 

And out of curiosity, if the cops tell your client "we know you did it! Where'd you bury the body?", you're going to tell your client to STFU.  Is this contempt of court?  Admitting you know where the body is would incriminate him.  Yet the body is evidence that the prosecution would have a right to access.

I don't understand the question, rephrase it please.

My point was that if they knew they were going to bust the woman, then they should have accounted for the possibility that she had encrypted her data.   They conceivably had a search warrant (although in this climate, who knows), so they could have investigated her and found out her password before they put the cuffs on her.  Spy on her until she types it in.  Install a keylogger.  Wait till she logs in and then flashbang her ass.  It's really not that hard to get the information if you do it before the suspect goes into lockdown mode. 

And this is part of the reason why the ominous words of the Assistant US Attorney don't really mean much to me.  They'll find ways of getting what they want eventually. 

[El Barto]

And this is part of the reason why the ominous words of the Assistant US Attorney don't really mean much to me.  They'll find ways of getting what they want eventually.

And without too much effort, apparently:

Constitutional Showdown Voided: Feds Decrypt Laptop Without Defendant’s Help
Kind of confirms my position that they were just being lazy.  They weren't dealing with something impenetrable; just extremely difficult. 

In related news, a different appellate court decided in another case that a ordering a defendant to provide an encryption key does violate his fifth amendment rights. 

The decision by the 11th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals said that an encrypted hard drive is akin to a combination to a safe, and is off limits, because compelling the unlocking of either of them is the equivalent of forcing testimony.

Judging from that ruling, I suspect that the question of combination locked safes has never come up.  I suppose that there's never been one that they couldn't get in through other means, so there was never any cause to set a precedent. 

[Scheavo]

In principle, would this also make it unconstitutional to require me to ID myself? It's only so now if suspected of a crime, ya? If forcing me to ID myself picks up a warrant, and my arrest, I just forced into a vital piece of evidence, leading to my arrest. In some instances, say a restraining order, it could be very perfinent. Seems to me that this falls under the same umbrella.